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SURVEY SAYS...
More than thirty years have passed since Congress enacted Title IX, the
statute prohibiting sex discrimination by schools, colleges, and universities
that receive federal funding.' In that time, Congress has confirmed 2-and
reconfirmed'-the statute's application to college athletic programs, and
the Supreme Court has strengthened the statute's enforcement by
construing a private right of action for both injunctive relief4 and, in certain
cases, money damages.5 Bolstered by these measures, Title IX is duly
credited for increasing the number of athletic opportunities for women and
girls.6
But at the college level, female athletes still have far fewer opportunities
to participate in athletics relative to their male peers.' At most colleges and
universities, the percentage of student athletes who are female is lower than
the percentage of female college students.8 One reason for this is that Title

1. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
2. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000)).
3. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2000)). This statute expressly provided that Title IX applied to an entire
educational institution, regardless of the specific programs receiving federal funds. Id. Congress
passed this statute to nullify the Supreme Court's interpretation that Title IX only applied to
the specific programs receiving federal funds, Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563-68
(1984), a limitation that effectively insulated from Title IX athletic programs that do not receive
any federal funds.
4. SeeCannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
5. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 76 (1992) (allowing a plaintiff to
recover money damages when the defendant's violation of Title IX-in that case, an act of
sexual harassment-was intentional). See generallyJackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.
167 (2005) (extending Title IX's private right of action to include a coach's claim that a school
fired him in retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination against his players).
6. SEC'Y OF EDUC.'S COMM'N ON OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS, "OPEN TO ALL": TITLE IX AT
THIRTY
13 (Feb.
28,
2003)
[hereinafter
COMMISSION
REPORT],
available at

http://www.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf. For example, in 1971
1972, the 30,000 women who participated in intercollegiate and college recreational athletics
made up 15% of all participants. By 2000-2001, the number of female athletes had increased to
150,000 (a 400% increase). Id. at 13.
7. Women generally make up only 42% of all college athletes, while constituting 56% of
enrolled undergraduates. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 13. Moreover, women generally
receive 43% of athletic scholarships, and their sports receive 32% of athletic departments'
operating budgets. Id. at 19. A disparity exists at earlier levels of education as well-about one
million fewer girls than boys participate in high school sports. Id. at 13-14. The
disproportionality at the college level is emphasized here due to this Article's particular focus
on new regulatory changes that affect Title IX's application to college and university athletics.
8. See Lee Sigelman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, GenderProportionalityin IntercollegiateAthletics: The
Mathematics of Title IX Compliance, 80 Soc. SCI. Q. 518, 524, 528 (1999) (noting that only a
"handful" of NCAA Division I schools satisfied proportionality compliance); Deborah J.
Anderson et al., Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: Determinants of Title IX Compliance 3
(Cornell Higher Educ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 45, 2004), available at
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/wp/cheri wp45.pdf (reporting 2001-2002 data that show women
are still underrepresented among athletes at most schools; the average proportionality gap
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IX and its implementing regulations do not mandate that universities attain
substantial proportionality. 9 In fact, the regulatory compliance policy that
the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR")' 0 has administered since 1979 allows for
three separate and alternative measures (or "prongs") for complying with
Title IX. Universities' efforts to attain compliance under the proportionality
prong are often stymied by budget constraints, perceived or otherwise," that
prevent universities from achieving proportionality by simply adding
opportunities for women. And while universities could alternatively attain
proportionality by capping or reducing athletic opportunities for men, 12 this
approach is3 unpopular among male athletes, their coaches, and their
supporters.1

among all schools in the sample was 13%); WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., TITLE IX AT 30:
(2002), available at http://womenssportsfoundation.org/binary
data/WSF._ARTICLE/pdf__file/902.pdf (reporting that 23% of "Division I colleges provided
athletic opportunities for women within five percentage points of female student enrollment").
The increase in the number of college-bound women has made proportionality compliance an
increasingly tall order. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that women make up
56% of all college undergraduates). The more women are represented in the student-body
population, the more likely they are to receive proportionately fewer athletic opportunities.
Anderson et al., supra,at 3 (finding that universities with a large share of undergraduates who
are female also have a large proportionality gap).
9. Proportionality need not be exact-the policy calls for a ratio of male/female athletes
that is "substantially" proportionate to the male/female ratio of undergraduate enrollment.
Dep't of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights, A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Policy
Interpretation]. "Substantially" is never quantitatively defined, but no school that has athletic
participation rates within five percentage points of the undergraduate enrollment has been
found to violate Tide IX. Sigelman & Wahlbeck, supranote 8, at 525.
10. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,418. The Office for Civil Rights became
a division of the Department of Education when the Department became effective in 1980.
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (1979).
11. Donald E. Shelton, Equally Bad Is Not Good: Allowing Title IX "Compliance" &y the
Elimination of Men's Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 253, 261 (2001) (arguing that if
financial constraints truly motivated universities' decisions to eliminate teams, they would start
with expensive teams, like football, given that, except for the top forty or fifty Division I schools,
most lose large sums of money on football).
12. A General Accounting Office study found that 28% of the 948 four-year colleges that
added one or more women's teams between 1981 and 2001 also reduced the number of men's
ATHLETICS RECEIVE C+ 2

opportunities. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-297, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES' EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS 14-15 (Mar. 2001)

[hereinafter GAO STUDY], availableat http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01297.pdf; see also Elisa
Hatlevig, Title IX Compliance: Looking Past the ProortionalityProng, 12 SPORTS LAW. J. 87, 97
(2005). Compared head-to-head, however, the number of eliminated men's teams-386
nearly doubled the number of eliminated women's teams. GAO STUDY, supra,at 14.
13. One hundred seventy-one wrestling teams, comprising 2,648 individual opportunities
for collegiate wrestlers, were eliminated between 1981 and 2001. GAO STUDY, supra note 12, at
11, 13. As a result of these losses, wrestlers and their allies have brought many (unsuccessful)
challenges to Title IX and proportionality compliance. See, e.g., Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v.
Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 935, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d
1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2002) (unsuccessfully challenging a university's decision to eliminate

SURVEY SAYS...
This double bind causes many colleges and universities to strive for
compliance with the second or third compliance prongs instead of
proportionality. Under the second prong, a university can satisfy its Tide IX
compliance obligations-notwithstanding a disproportionate distribution of
athletic opportunities-by showing a history and continuing practice of
expanding athletic opportunities for women. 14 Because it is impossible to
show a continuing practice of expanding women's opportunities without
eventually reaching a distribution of opportunities that complies with prong
one, prong two is, by its terms, an interim measure of compance.
Prong three allows a university to justify its disparate distribution of
athletic opportunities by demonstrating that it fully and effectively
accommodates its female students' interests and abilities in athletics. 6 But
determining the extent to which women are interested in athletics is a
complex problem. Social structures, including signals from universities that
devalue women's sports as compared to men's, have influenced women's
interests in athletics and are responsible, to some degree, for lack of athletic
interest among women. As long as these social structures continue to relate
to athletics in a gender-specific manner, it is impossible to isolate the extent
to which women's interest in athletics is socially constructed. Under a theory
of equality that accounts for the effect of these social structures (which I
herein call "structuralist equality"), taking into account women's lack of
interest in athletics relative to their male peers is ineffective and circular.
OCR and the federal courts have, to some extent, recognized that social
structures, including colleges and universities, have constructed women's
interests in sports and have been reluctant to make prong three an easy or

wrestling in pursuit of proportionality compliance); Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ.,
302 F.3d 608, 609-10 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1002-03
(S.D. Iowa 1995) (same).
14. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,414.
15.
"[I]n light of the thirty years since Title IX's passage, it is difficult for any college to
boast a history and continuing practice of program expansion for women if the school still does
not provide proportionally equal opportunities for both sexes." Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for
You and One for Me: Is Title IX's Sex-Based ProportionalityRequirement for College Varsity Athletic
PositionsDefensible?, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 731, 741 (2003); see also Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (insisting that a school demonstrate both a history
and genuinely continuingpractice to satisfy prong two, while also recognizing that "in times of
economic hardship, few schools will be able to ... continu[e] to expand their women's athletic
programs").
Prong-two compliance, while appropriately considered an interim manner of
compliance, should not be confused with interim proportionality. While proportionality can be
achieved by increasing opportunities for women and/or reducing opportunities for men, OCR
has explained that only program expansion for women satisfies prong two. OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE:
THE THREE-PART TEST (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 CLARIFICATION], available at
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.htnl.
16. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,414.
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attractive compliance option.1 7 OCR and the courts include qualitative and
subjective factors, such as athletic interest in women's sports generated
outside the university, as relevant to the question of whether a university
fully and effectively accommodates women's interests in athletics. This multi
faceted approach ratchets up the compliance bar under prong three. It also
ensures that proportionality under prong one remains the only permanent
compliance option subject to a qualitative formula that measures predictable
factors within the institution's control. As a result, institutions seeking a truly
"safe harbor""' from liability unhappily view proportionality compliance as
their only real, long-term option for complying with Title IX. 19 However,
when the regulated institutions complained that they were being compelled
toward prong-one proportionality compliance, OCR espoused that the test
was flexible and that the prongs were equally favored. 0 Confusion ensued.2'
In 2005, OCR clarified prong three by allowing universities to
administer surveys to their enrolled female students and rely on the results
to demonstrate that women's interests-and as a result, prong three-are
satisfied.22 While a university is obligated to expand its offerings to
accommodate unmet interest that the survey reveals, the survey's
methodology can make that outcome unlikely. 23 As a result, prong three
compliance will not only be easier to attain, but from a university counsel's
perspective, it will be a strong, reliable bulwark against enforcement actions

17.

Prong three makes it "difficult for a college to defend its lack of proportional

opportunities by arguing that it has fully accommodated women's interests and abilities."
Yuracko, supra note 15, at 741; see also infra Part III.B (explaining how the courts have rejected
watered-down interpretations of prong-three compliance).
18. OCR itself used this phrase in describing the proportionality prong. 1996
CLARIFICATION, supranote 15, at 1.
19. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a lower
court's suggestion that proportionality was not determinative of Title IX compliance in the
context of athletic participation); Sigelman & Wahlbeck, supra note 8, at 521 ("Realistically,
then, the compliance issue boils down to whether a school can pass the proportionality test.");
Yuracko, supra note 15, at 741 (explaining why compliance "most often comes down to the
proportionality requirement"); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 23-24; cf. Jeffrey H.
Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: EqualAthletic Opportunitiesfor Women, 3 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y
131, 144 (1996) (suggesting OCR intended prongs two and three to be transitional "bridges"
rather than permanent compliance measures).
20.

OFFICE

FOR

CIVIL

RIGHTS,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

EDUC.,

FURTHER

CLARIFICATION

OF

INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE REGARDING TITLE IX COMPLANCE [sic] (July 11,

2003) [hereinafter 2003 CLARIFICATION], available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/title9guidancefinal.html; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ADDITIONAL
CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY: THREE-PART TEST-PART THREE 1 (Mar.
available
at
http://www.ed.gov/
17,
2005)
[hereinafter
2005
CLARIFICATION],
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tide9guidanceadditional.pdf.
21.
22.

COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 25-26.
2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 5; see also infra Part II.B.

23.

See infra Part II.B.

SURVEY SAYS ...

827

and lawsuits. In other words, interest-defined compliance will be a truly
"equally favored" prong.
However, while the 2005 Clarification restores genuine flexibility to the
three-prong test, it does so in disregard for, and at the expense of, the
structuralist-equality concerns that courts have recognized. Without the
more volatile, uncertain brand of immunity that the pre-2005 prong three
offered, universities now have no regulatory incentive to strive for a more
proportionate distribution of athletic opportunities. Instead, through their
disparate offerings, they will continue to position women's athletics at the
margins and contribute to society's perception of athletics as primarily
masculine activities. This "antinormalization" of women's participation helps
to negatively construct women's interests in sports.
Part I of this Article provides background on Title IX and its regulatory
regime. 24 Part II describes and critiques the Model SurVey15 that institutions
may now use under the 2005 Clarification. 26 Part III argues that the interestsurvey policy is inherently inconsistent with the structuralist equality goals of
Title IX. That Part describes how various social structures, including
educational institutions and Title IX itself, have constructed women's
interests in athletics by antinormalizing their athletic participation; 7 how
the federal appellate courts and the three-prong policy itself espouse a
version of Title IX rooted in structuralist equality; 2s and how the newly
clarified version of the three-prong policy undermines this structuralist
equality.21
Part IV argues that repealing the 2005 Clarification and restoring the
agency's former interpretation of the three-prong policy will not resolve the
inherent tension between the three-prong policy and OCR's express desire
3
to give universities a flexible test with more than one compliance endpoint. 0
To resolve this tension, OCR has two choices. It could abandon the
"flexibility" rhetoric and acknowledge that, to be consistent with the
structuralist equality reflected in Title IX, prong three, like prong two, is
only justified as an interim compliance measure. Or it could offer an
alternative to proportionality compliance that is defined by an objective
measure other than interest. This Article suggests that proportionate
funding (as opposed to proportionate number of opportunities) would be
an appropriate alternative "fourth prong" because it would require the

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part I.
infra Part II.A.
infraPart II.B.
infra Part III.A.
infra Part III.B.
infta Part III.C.
infraPart IV.
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university to signal equal valuation of women's sports, mitigating the social
forces that have antinormalized women's participation in sports.
I.

TITLE IX AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND

To place OCR's new Model Survey approach to Title IX compliance in
context, this Part first provides background on Title IX, its implementing
regulations, and the various policy interpretations and clarifications that
OCR has released over the years. Title IX of the Education Amendments of
197231 prohibits sex discrimination by any educational institution receiving
federal support,32 a broad class of institutions that includes the vast majority
of accredited colleges and universities, as well as secondary and elementary
schools. Though Title IX is perhaps best known for prohibiting sex
discrimination in athletics,

33

the original statute does not expressly address

that context. In fact, Congress enacted Title IX in response to extensive
findings of discrimination against women in the classroom.34 It apparently

35
paid little attention to Title IX's application to athletics.
However, as the OCR3 6 began its task of promulgating Title IX's
implementing regulations, the issue of athletics quickly became the center
of public and regulatory debate. In response, Congress amended Title IX,
directing OCR to make "reasonable [regulatory] provisions considering the
nature of particular sports" in intercollegiate athletics. 37 The implementing
regulations promulgated pursuant to this mandate, along with OCR's
periodic policy interpretations, define what it means for an educational
institution's athletic program to discriminate "on the basis of sex."

31.
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000).
32. Id. § 1681 (a) ("No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance."). Nearly all colleges and
universities, and most high schools and middle schools, receive some federal funds. B. Glenn
George, Fifty/Fifty: EndingSex Segregation in School Sports, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1107 (2002).
33.

JODY

FEDER,

CONG.

RESEARCH

SERV.,

TITLE

IX,

SEX

DISCRIMINATION

AND

INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 2 (2004).
34.
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing 118 CONG. REC. 5804
(1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)).
35.

SARAH K. FIELDS, FEMALE GLADIATORS: GENDER, LAW, AND CONTACT SPORT IN AMERICA

11 (2005) (noting that the only discussion of Title IX and sports was a comment by Title IX's
co-sponsor, Senator Birch Bayh, who said that the law would not mandate desegregation of
football teams and men's locker rooms).

36. OCR was a division of what was then the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare. OCR is now located in the Department of Education.
37. The so-called "Javits Amendment," named after its sponsor, Jacob K. Javits of New
York, authorized OCR to regulate college athletics. Gender and Athletics Act, Pub. L. No. 93
380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484, 612 (1974). Congress passed the Javits Amendment after rejecting an
amendment proposed by Senator John Tower of Texas that would have exempted revenueproducing sports, such as men's football and men's basketball. See FIELDS, supranote 35, at 11;
George, supra note 32, at 1113-14.

SURVEY SAYS...
This Part will first examine the implementing regulations that OCR has
promulgated to govern athletic programs pursuant to Title IX. Second, it
will analyze the sources of the three-prong test: OCR's 1979 Policy
Interpretation of the implementing regulations' equal-opportunity-in
participation requirement and subsequent policy statements clarifying the
three-prong test. (The relationship between the statute, the regulation, and
the various policy statements is illustrated in Figure 1 below.) Finally, it will
address the Commission on Opportunity in Athletics, whose 2003 findings
illustrate and contextualize the political debate about the three-prong policy
and whose recommendations included the interest-survey concept that OCR
adopted in the 2005 Clarification.
FIGURE 1: TITLE IX STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES

federally funded education institutions.

Implementing Regulations Governing Athletic Programs
Separate: Institutions may maintain single-sex teams in contact sports.

Equal:
Scholarships: Individual
scholarships must be equal
in amount (though not
necessarily in number).

Participation:
Opportunities must
accommodate the interests
and abilities of both sexes,

Other factors: Equipment,
coaching, schedules,
facilities, etc. must be equal
between men's and
women's programs.

1979 Policy Interpretation
Prong One:
Opportunities for
female athletes
substantially
proportionate to
women's
enrollment

Prong Two:
History and
continued practice
of expanding
opportunities for
women

Prong Three:
Full and effective
accommodation of
women's interests
and abilities

1996 Clarification: Standard is whether there is "unmet interest" among female
students in a particular sport and whether the institution would be able to
"sustain a team" that would enjoy "a reasonable expectation of competition."
Student questionnaires, among other measures, such as regional and local
interest, would be used to determine whether this standard was met.

2005 Clarification: Institutions may use Model Survey results to measure whether
they are fully and effectively accommodating female students' interests and
abilities.
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THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

The implementing regulations to Title IX, promulgated in 1975 and
substantively unchanged since then, contain several provisions governing
intercollegiate, interscholastic, club, and intramural athletics sponsored by
federally funded institutions." These regulations convey two themesseparate and equal. Schools may retain sex-segregated teams, at least in
contact sports.3 9 Nevertheless, to ensure these separate programs are still
40
equal,
the regulations require that institutions provide "equal athletic
,,41
opportunity for both sexes.
There are three components of the implementing regulations that seek
to ensure that separate athletic programs for men and women are, in some
respects, equal. 4' First, the most important factor in deciding whether an
institution satisfies the equal opportunity requirement is whether
opportunities for participation "effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of both sexes." 43 This requirement of equality in participation is the
"heartland"44 of the equal-opportunity requirement because it seeks to
ensure a nondiscriminatory distribution of athletic opportunities. As
explained in the next section, the three-prong test interprets this regulatory
provision. Second, the regulations provide that OCR will consider other
factors, such as equitable distribution of equipment, access to facilities,
compensation of coaches, and publicity, to ensure that the quality of the
women's program is comparable to the quality of the men's program. 45

38.

34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2005).

39. Id.The "Separate Teams" regulation provides that "a recipient may operate or sponsor
separate teams for members of each sex where selection of such teams is based upon
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport." Id. In the absence of a women's team
in a particular sport, the institution must let a woman try out for the men's team, as long as the

sport in which she is seeking to participate is a non-contact sport. Id. Contact sports are
"boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major
activity ofwhich involves bodily contact." Id.
40. See FIELDS, supranote 35, at 11 (reporting that OCR considered a co-ed team approach
but enacted a separate-but-equal framework instead); see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill.,
35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the regulations do not mandate co-ed teams and
instead require that separate teams provide equal opportunities to both sexes).
41.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) ("A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club, or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for

members of both sexes.').
42.
See generally VALERIE BONNETrE & LAMAR DANIEL, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TITLE IX
ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (1990) (separating the compliance factors into three major

categories: effective accommodation

(measured by the three-prong compliance test),

scholarships, and other factors).
43. 34C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).
44. Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 1), 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993).
45. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (2)-(10) (listing "[s]cheduling of games and practice time";

"[t]ravel and per diem allowance[s]"; "[o]pportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring"; "[pirovision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities"; "[p]rovision of

SURVEY SAYS...

Third, a separate regulatory provision requires that athletic scholarships be
awarded in proportion to the number of students of each sex participating
in interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics. 46 One factor that does not

enter into OCR's formula for equal opportunity is funding. The
implementing regulations expressly state that compliance does not
require
47
equal aggregate funding for men's and women's athletic programs.
B.

THE THREE-PRONG COMPLIANCEPOLICY

In 1979, OCR published a Policy Interpretation of the regulatory
requirement that educational institutions "effectively accommodate the
interests and abilities of members of both sexes. "0 8 The Policy Interpretation
sets forth three alternative measures of compliance-known as the threeprong test-to determine whether institutions satisfy the equal-participation
requirement. As noted above, these three prongs are (1) a substantial
proportionality between the percentage of student athletes who are female
to the percentage of students who are female; (2) a history and continuing
practice of expanding women's athletic programs; and (3) full 50and effective

accommodation of women 's

49

interests and abilities in athletics.

medical and training facilities and services"; "[p]rovision of housing and dining facilities and
services"; and "[p]ublicity"); see also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,417 (adding
recruiting services and other support services).
46. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c). For example, if 55% of the student athletes are men, male
athletes should receive 55% of the available financial assistance for athletics. BONNETrE &
DANIEL, supra note 42, at 15.
47. Bonnette and Daniel note:
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the
Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams
for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex.
BONNETrE & DANIEL, supra note 42, at 15. Moreover, "identical benefits, opportunities, or
treatment are not required, provided the overall effect of any difference is negligible" or
attributable to "unique aspects of particular sports" or "sex neutral factors." 1979 Policy
Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,415.
48. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,417 (quoting the implementing
regulation currently codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (1)).
49. Allowing for the possibility that at some institutions men may have disproportionately
fewer athletic opportunities than women, the 1979 Policy Interpretation refers not to women
but to the "underrepresented" sex. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,418. But OCR
acknowledges that "participation in college sports has historically been emphasized for men but
not women," which has "contributed to existing differences in the number of sports and scope
of competition for men and women"-the number of opportunities for men outweighing
opportunities for women. Id. at 71,419. Therefore, for simplicity, I will refer to "women" instead
of the more cumbersome "underrepresented sex" when describing the elements of the threeprong test.
50. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supranote 9.
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While OCR has repeatedly emphasized that institutions enjoy flexibility
in measuring compliance by any one of three options,5' institutions have
generally found compliance under prongs one and two to be increasingly
difficult to attain. Several decades since the Policy Interpretation's
inception, 2 the option of complying with prong two by demonstrating both
a history and a continuing practice of expanding programs has become
difficult, if not impossible. 3 As for prong one, increases in women's overall
college enrollment set the compliance bar ever higher.54 And budget
shortfalls that compel universities to eliminate athletic opportunities rather
than add them cause many to associate proportionality compliance with cuts
to men's sports that do not generate revenue, further decreasing the
desirability of prong one. 55
The third prong thus became the focal point for many institutions'
compliance efforts, and as such, has been the subject of OCR's subsequent
clarifications. In 1996, OCR explained that it would determine whether an
institution complied with the third prong by considering whether there is
"unmet interest" among female students in a particular sport and whether
the institution would be able to "sustain a team" of female participants that
would enjoy "a reasonable expectation of competition. ,,56 In terms of
measuring "unmet interest," OCR would look at indicators such as:
0 requests by students and admitted students that a particular
sport be added;

51.
1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note
CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 3.

15; 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20; 2005

52. Moreover, for a period of time between 1984 and 1989, after the Supreme Court held
that Tide IX did not apply to components of education programs, like athletics, that did not
directly receive federal funding, and before Congress clarified the statute to negate that
interpretation, see supranote 3, university athletic departments had no Title IX obligations that
would have compelled them to add programs.
53. See, e.g., George, supranote 32, at 1118; Yuracko, supranote 15, at 741. Moreover, any
school that truly did so for thirty years would probably satisfy substantial proportionality
compliance. Of the 130 institutions that OCR reviewed between 1992 and 2002, only eight
attempted to comply under prong two, in comparison to the eighty-six that attempted to
comply under prong three and the thirty-six that satisfied prong one. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, USER'S GUIDE TO DEVELOPING STUDENT INTEREST SURVEYS UNDER TITLE IX 3 (Mar.

2005) [hereinafter USER'S GUIDE].
54. FEDER, supra note 33, at 8 (noting that women's enrollment in post-secondary
institutions rose 30% between 1981 and 1999); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 13 (stating
that women's enrollment as college undergraduates-measured at 56% in 1997-exceeds
men's enrollment).
55. See, e.g., Martha Burk & Natasha Plumly, Who Owns Sports? The Politics of Title IX, 14
MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 49, 51 (2003); see also Orleans, supra note 19, at 132 (describing the "rift"
that develops between male and female student athletes "as each group is told, or comes to
believe, that its opportunities must be limited in order to increase those of the other group").
56. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 15. The 1996 Clarification also addressed prong-one
compliance by declining to require exact proportionality, emphasizing a case- and fact-specific
approach over "strict numerical formulas or 'cookie cutter' answers." Id
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*
*

*

requests that an existing club sport be elevated to
intercollegiate team status;
participation in particular club or intramural sports;
interviews with students, admitted students, coaches,
administrators, and others regarding interest in particular
sports;
results of questionnaires of student and admitted students
regarding interests in particular sports; . . . participation in

particular [] interscholastic sports by admitted students [;and]
participation rates in sports in high schools, amateur athletic
associations, and community sports leagues that operate in
57
areas from which the institution draws its students ....
Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with prong three persisted, along with
rhetoric of confusion about what Title IX compliance entails. 5 Because
OCR's multifactor approach measured compliance under prong three based
on qualitative, subjective factors, institutions claimed to be uncertain of
whether their athletic programs satisfied OCR's test,5 or more importantly,
*

whether they could be successfully defended in court.

9

Also, several federal appellate courts consider the elimination of an
existing, viable women's team to be defacto evidence of "unmet interest" and
noncompliance with prong three. 6 For example, in Cohen v. Brown
University,61 the First Circuit rejected a university's attempt to eliminate two
men's and two women's teams at the same time.62 This seemingly even

57.

Id. Factors are similar to OCR's internal manual for investigators. See BONNETrE &

DANIEL, supra note 42, at 24-27. In addition, the 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9,

afforded flexibility to institutions, allowing them to gauge interest level by any method of their
choosing, provided:
(a) The processes take into account the nationally increasing levels of women's
interests and abilities;
(b) The methods of determining interest and ability do not disadvantage the

members of an underrepresented sex;
(c) The methods of determining ability take into account team performance
records; and
(d) The methods are responsive to the expressed interests of students capable of
intercollegiate competition who are members of an underrepresented sex.
58. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 25-26.
59. Id. at 23-24.
60. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 256, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
the University of Illinois could not eliminate the women's swim team without violating prong

three, because "women with a demonstrated interest in an intercollegiate athletic activity and
demonstrated ability to compete at the intercollegiate level would be left without an
opportunity to participate in their sport"); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824,
832 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,904 (1st Cir. 1993).
61.
Cohen 1,991 F.2d at 906.

62.

Id.
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handed attempt to reduce athletic expenditures rendered Brown
noncompliant with prong three. The court recognized that a school cannot
cancel a "healthy" women's team and still claim to "fully and effectively
accommodate" women's interests and abilities in athletics. 6 1 Since Cohen,

prong three ensures that at institutions failing the proportionality test under
prong one, existing women's sports teams are protected from elimination in
a way that men's sports teams are not. 64 This interpretation fueled criticism
that the three-prong test, rather than universities' disparate distribution of
athletic opportunities or the financial constraints
forcing them to cut teams,
65
was responsible for cuts in men's sports.
C.

THE COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITY INATHLETICS

In response to this controversy, the Department of Education decided
in 2002 to charge a commission to study Title IX's athletics regulations and
policy with an eye toward reform. The Commission heard both expert and
lay testimony at open town hall meetings in several cities across the United
States. 6 6 It also received comments by letter, telephone, and e-mail. 67 The
Commission released its report with recommendations and findings in
68
February 2003. The Commission's work was significant for two reasons.
First, it provided a formal, quasi-regulatory forum for debates over many
controversial aspects of Title IX's application to college and university
athletics. Second, its recommendations regarding interest surveys ultimately
resulted in OCR's adoption of that methodology for measuring compliance
with prong three in 2005.
The Commission heard arguments that Title IX is an affirmative action
quota that caps or eliminates opportunities for men. 69 These arguments
ranged from the emotional and sentimental-cries of "Let our sons
play[!]" 7 -- to the statistical-reports of numbers and percentages of
women's overall gains and men's overall losses in athletic opportunity in the
age of Title IX. 7 1 Many critics blamed the elimination of men's teams, such

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 24.
66. Id. at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 1.
69. Id. at 24.
70. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 8.
71.
Id. at 19 (showing that men's teams were discontinued more often than women's in
the 1990s). However, more recent data suggest that the trend of losses in men's sports is
changing direction. Welch Suggs, Gender Quotas? Not in College Sports, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
July 1, 2005, at A24 [hereinafter Suggs, Gender Quotas] (reporting that the Department of
Education's most recent data show the total number of male athletes increasing "by about 2,700
between 2002-3 and 2003-4, and the number of men's teams either increased or remained
steady across all divisions").
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as wrestling, track and field, swimming and diving, and baseball, on
institutions' efforts to attain proportionality and avail themselves of the "safe
harbor" from lawsuits. 72 In its report, the Commission acknowledged that

the burdensome proportionality test under prong one has been a factor in
universities' decisions to cut or cap teams. 7 While noting that "[flacility
limitations and budgetary concerns" also influence these decisions, the
Commission recognized that institutions "cannot ignore the potential effect
of their decision on Title IX compliance" and apparently fear "litigation if
[they] cut[] a women's team without being in compliance with the
proportionality test."7"
The
Commission's
published
report
includes
twenty-three
recommendations, fifteen of which received the Commissioners' unanimous
approval.7 5 These unanimously approved recommendations were "rather
benign in nature and merely call [ed] for clarity and consistency in Title IX
enforcement by OCR."76 For instance, the Commission recommended that
OCR "make clear that/. cutting
teams
o/
•
,,77 in order to demonstrate compliance
with Title IX is a disfavored practice.
In contrast, other recommendations garnered dissent among the
commissioners and compelled two to refuse to sign on to the report. 7s Some

of these recommendations modified prong one so as to reduce the
difference between universities' existing offerings and a proportional
distribution of athletic opportunities for women. For example, the
Commission recommended that institutions be allowed to exclude
"nontraditional

,

9

students from the general student population.80 This

recommendation was controversial because women are "disproportionately
likely to be the 'non-traditional' older students excluded under this
proposal.". Thus, excluding them from the student population reduces the
percentage of female students counted for compliance purposes and, in

72.

COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 23.

73.

Id. at 24.

74.

Id. at 24-25.

75.

Id. at 59-60.

76. Lisa Yonka Stevens, Note, The Sport of Numbers: Manipulating Title IX to Rationalize
DiscriminationAgainst Women, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 155, 170; see also COMMISSION REPORT,
supranote 6, at 33-40 (setting forth the recommendations).
77. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 34 (recommendation five).
78. These Commissioners published their minority views in a separate report. See generally
JULIE FOUDY & DONNA DE VARONA, MINORITY VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
OPPORTUNITY IN ATHLETICS (Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT], available at

http://womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/rights/articles.html?record=944.
79. Nontraditional students are those "not between the ages of 18 and 24 and students of
any age who have children." MINORITY REPORT, supra note 78, at 14.
80. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (recommendation twenty).
81. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 78, at 14.
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turn, the percentage of female student athletes a university must have to
attain proportionality under prong one.
Another controversial recommendation would let institutions count
unfilled roster spots as actual student athletes, raising concerns that
universities could attain proportionality under prong one on the backs of
potential rather than actual female athletes. 82 These recommendations and
others appeared to the dissenting commissioners to weaken Title IX's
protection against discrimination by undermining proportionality
compliance. 3
The Commission also recommended that OCR consider allowing
institutions to rely on the results of surveys gauging whether an institution's
athletic offerings satisfy its female students' interests and abilities.84
Redefining compliance under prong three as a proportion between the ratio
of male and female athletes to the ratio of male and female students who
express an interest in athletics would provide institutions with a
"quantifiable way of demonstrating compliance.
A minority of
commissioners feared that this manner of compliance would "prevent future
progress in providing opportunities for women" because it failed to
acknowledge either the causal effect that opportunity has on interest levels
or the historical patterns of discrimination against women's interest in
athletics. 86

In

a

separate,

independent

report,

the

two

dissenting

commissioners argued:
Using interest surveys is a way to force girls and women to prove
their right to equal opportunity before giving them a chance to
play. The proposal rests on the stereotyped notion that women are
inherently less interested in sports than men-a notion that
contradicts Title IX and fundamental principles of civil rights law. 87

82. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 37 (recommendation fifteen). The objection
here is obvious: Schools could comply with Title IX without having to ensure that actual women
fill their theoretical participation rates. MINORIY REPORT, supra note 78, at 13. Moreover, the
minority Commissioners found it particularly troubling for a school that spends 112% more
recruiting men than women-and that then, as a result, has fewer women participating on its

women's teams-to be able to claim credit for providing a "predetermined" hypothetical
number of opportunities regardless of whether those opportunities are filled by actual student
athletes. Id
83. MINORTY REPORT, supranote 78, at 1.
84. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 38-39 (recommendations eighteen and
nineteen).
85. Id. at 38.
86. Id.
87. MINORITY REPORT, supranote 78, at 16.
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II.

THE MODEL SURVEY AND ITS CONTROVERSIAL METHODOLOGY

At first, the Department of Education refrained from adopting any of
the Commission's recommendations."" In 2005, however,8 9 OCR announced
a new clarification of the three-prong compliance policy. Consistent with the
Commission's recommendation, the newly clarified policy allows institutions
to demonstrate compliance with the third prong by relying on the results of
a survey of enrolled students' interests and abilities in athletics. 90 The 2005
Clarification provides detailed instructions for assessing students' interest
using a Web-based "Model Survey" developed by the National Center for
Education Statistics. 91 An institution that administers the survey according to
OCR's instructions enjoys the presumption of prong-three compliance when
survey results indicate lack of interest sufficient to sustain additional female
varsity teams. 92 To be clear, OCR does not require institutions to administer

the Model Survey or any survey to demonstrate compliance with the third
prong. Further, no institution is required to use the third prong at all.
However, it is reasonable to expect, given the unpopularity of prong-one

proportionality compliance, that institutions will select prong three, the

88. After the Commission Report's release, women's sports advocates held their collective
breath expecting the Department of Education to adopt many of the controversial
recommendations. But they exhaled a sigh of relief when, five months later, OCR issued a
"clarification letter" that merely reiterated the alternative nature of the three prongs, reminded
institutions that nothing in Title IX requires them to eliminate men's teams, and pledged to
"aggressively enforce Title IX standards." 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20, at 2-3; see also
Stevens, supra note 76, at 156 (pointing out that the Department of Education could adopt any
of these recommendations at any time in the future).
89. See Christine Brennan, E-Mail Surveys May Be First Step in Effort to Cripple Progressof Title
IX, USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 2005, at 8C (suggesting that the Department of Education deliberately
waited out the intervening election before announcing this unpopular change).
90. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20, at iv. Recall OCR's 1996 Clarification of the third
prong:
An institution is in compliance with the third prong so long as there is no sport for
which, with respect to the underrepresented sex, there is unmet interest and ability
to sustain an intercollegiate team that would have a reasonable expectation of
competition. If there is a sport for which those conditions are met, the institution
must either provide that sport or show that it is meeting the interests and abilities
of the underrepresented sex.
1996 CLARIFICATION, supranote 15.

91. NCES developed a User's Guide to Developing Student Interest Surveys Under Title IX, supra
note 53, which was released with the Policy Clarification, along with a Technical Manual for
Developing the User's Guide that was generated by the National Institution of Statistical Sciences.
See generally NAT'L INST. OF STATISTICAL SCIENCES, TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR DEVELOPING THE
USER'S GUIDE (2005) [hereinafter TECHNICAL MANUAL].

92. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20, at 7. The presumption can be overcome "if OCR
finds direct and very persuasive evidence of unmet interest sufficient to sustain a varsity team
such as the recent elimination of a viable varsity team" or a recent petition to elevate a club
sport to varsity status. Id. Institutions may not use the failure to express interest during a survey
as grounds to eliminate a current and viable intercollegiate team. Id.
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compliance option that requires less expense and effort. As this Part
demonstrates, the Model Survey's design virtually guarantees that the
responses of interest and ability will not be sufficient to compel a university
to add teams for women.
This Part will first demonstrate how a student may be invited to
participate in a Model Survey. It will then provide a critique of the Model
Survey, listing the various reasons why the Model Survey is an inadequate
method of complying with the requirements of Title IX.
A.

A STUDENT TAKES THEMODEL SURVEY

A hypothetical university student might be invited to 94participate in the
93
Model Survey by an e-mail that reads something like this:
To: Student@university.edu
From: University Administration
Date: September 1, 2006
Subject: Athletic interest survey
DearStudent,
In an effort to determine whether our current offerings of intercollegiate,
club, and intramuralathletics meet the athletic interests and abilities of our
students, we are asking allfemale95 students to participatein a ten-minute,
confidentialsurvey.
First, the survey will ask for your demographic information, such as age,
gender,year in school, and whetheryou are afull- orpart-timestudent. You
will then be asked to provide information about your athletic experience,
current participation in athletic activities, and interest in future
participationin athleticactivities.
If you do not respond to the survey,
we will infer that you are not interested
S•• 96
in participatingin athletic actzvztzes.

93. OCR expressly suggests e-mails linking to the Model Survey Web site as an appropriate
method of inviting students' participation. 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 7.
94. OCR does not mandate e-mail text that educational institutions must use to distribute
Web links to the survey. I have based the text of this hypothetical e-mail largely on the text
contained in the first screen of the Model Survey, see TECHNICAL MANUAL, supranote 91, at 7;
2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 6.
95. An institution could instead choose to survey every full-time undergraduate rather
than just the women, and OCR notes that "ideally [the survey] will be administered to members
of both sexes." 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 6. Under either approach, sampling is not
permitted. Id.
96. OCR expressly provides that institutions may assume that a nonresponse indicates an
actual lack of interest, as long as all students have been given an easy opportunity to respond,
and the purpose of the survey (and the consequence of a nonresponse) has been made clear.
Id.
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Pleaseclick on the Web link below to begin the survey.
Thank youforyour cooperation,
The Administration
A student who links to the survey Web page
couple of preliminary screens-including one
bypass the rest of the survey altogether by giving
athletics" response-and then arrive at a list of

will click her way through a
giving her the option to
a blanket "not interested in
sports. The list contains all

NCAA-recognized varsity sports, 97 including designated "emerging sports."

8

From this list of thirty, the student is invited to check as many as she wants to
provide information about her past, present, and intended future
participation. The next screen brings up a grid: one row for each of the
sports she selected on the previous screen and one column for each of the
following four questions:
1.
At what level did you participate in this sport in high school:
Recreational, Intramural, Club, Junior Varsity, or Varsity?
2.
At what level are you participating in this sport at this university:
Recreational, Intramural, Club, or Intercollegiate?
3.
At what level do you wish to participate in this sport at this
university: Recreational, Intramural, Club, or Intercollegiate?
4.
Do you believe that you have the ability to participate at the
level in which you indicated interest: Yes, I have the ability, or
No, I would have to develop the ability? 99
After the student answers each of these four questions for as many
sports as she selected, the Web site displays a page that allows her to provide
additional comments or feedback. It also informs her that she may use the
survey form to request that the university's athletic department contact her
about her reported interest in athletics.
B.

CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL SURVEY

OCR's decision to allow Model Survey results to create a presumption of
compliance with prong three has been publicly criticized by the NCAA,' 00

97. If the surveying institution is not a member of the NCAA, the list would include the
varsity sports recognized by the national intercollegiate athletic association to which the school
belongs--either the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics or the National Junior

College Athletic Association. Id. at 7 n.13.
98.

NCAA lists the following emerging sports for women: archery, badminton, bowling,

equestrian, rugby, squash, synchronized swimming, and team handball. NCAA, Emerging
Sports for Women, available at http://wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membership.svcs/
emerging-sports/home.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
99. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supra note 91, at 62.

100. Press Release, NCAA, NCAA Leadership Groups Urge Department of Education to
Rescind Additional Clarification for Title IX and Maintain 1996 Clarification (Apr. 28, 2005),
available at http://www2.ncaa.org/media.and events/pressroom/2005/april/20050428
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newspaper editorials,0 1 advocacy groups, 0 2 more than 140 members of
Congress,'0 3 and even a Hollywood actor. 10 4 Opponents maintain that the
survey's flawed methodology virtually guarantees that a school relying on the
results will rarely have to increase women's sports opportunities.'0 5 Critics
have also objected to OCR's failure to seek public comment on the Model
Survey and have argued that the 2005 Clarification is inconsistent with
federal court decisions rejecting survey evidence to demonstrate compliance
with Title IX.106
As explained in more detail below, the Model Survey's major problems
are as follows. First, the time and manner of survey distribution may give rise
to reasons other than lack of interest that a student would fail to respond,
yet the 2005 Clarification allows institutions to count each passive
nonresponse as a conscious vote of no interest. Second, the Model Survey's
target population of currently enrolled students is problematic because it
ignores the highly relevant population of interested and capable female
student athletes who would have enrolled, or whom the school would have
been able to recruit, had the school offered the sport of their choice. Third,
the Model Survey gives controlling weight to respondents' self-assessment of
their own athletic ability and provides response options that are slanted in a
way that is likely to underreport ability.

titleix.resolution.html (announcing an NCAA Executive Commission resolution urging OCR to
rescind the policy and urging NCAA member institutions to decline the use of interest surveys).
101. See, e.g., Editorial, A New Attack on Women's Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at A20;
Editorial, Too Lax on Title IX WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A20.
102. See Letter from Lisa M. Maatz &Jocelyn Samuels, Nat'l Coal. for Women and Girls in
Educ., to Margaret Spellings, U.S. Secretary of Educ. (Mar. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.ncwge.org/documents/NCWGE.spellings.ltr.final/pdf;

DON SABO

& CHRISTINE

H.B. GRANT, CTR. FOR RES. ON PHYSICAL ACTIVITY, SPORT & HEALTH, LIMITATIONS OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION'S ONLINE SURVEY METHOD FOR MEASURING ATHLETIC INTEREST AND

ABILITY ON
U.S.A.
CAMPUSES
(June
2005),
available at www.dyc.edu/crpash/
limits-of_onlinesurvey.pdf; WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CREATES
HUGE TITLE IX COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE: THE FOUNDATION POSITION (June 16, 2005)
[hereinafter WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE], available at http://

www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/rights/article.html? record= 1009.
See
generally Save Title IX, http://www.SaveTitlelX.org (last visited March 10, 2006).
103. See Press Release, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Recognizes the 33rd
Anniversary of Title IX and the Opportunities Provided to Young Girls (June 22, 2005), available
at http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/June05/TitlelX.html (including the text of a
letter sent from House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi and more than 140 other House
Democrats to President George W. Bush).
104. "1am here to take you on a short ride in Thelma and Louise's car if you think it's fair
and just to limit a girl's opportunity to play sports based on her response to an interest survey."
COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 8 (quoting Geena Davis, "actress and amateur archer").
105.

See, e.g., WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102 (calling the

Model Survey a compliance "loophole").
106. Id.
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Fourth, under the 2005 Clarification, institutions can use the Model
Survey's results to determine the nature and number of participation
opportunities it must offer to comply with Title IX. Social scientists,
advocates, and the courts have recognized that opportunity, combined with
other social forces, generates interest.10 7 As a result, the Model Survey results
are likely to merely reflect and reinforce the status quo in which women's
athletic opportunities are disproportionately lower than men's.
An overarching critique levied by the Model Survey's opponents also
bears mention. Because OCR did not invite public comment before
announcing the 2005 Clarification,'08 there is no way to know whether OCR
or its contractors considered any of these problems when developing and
adopting the Model Survey.' 09
1.

Nonresponse Counts as Lack of Interest

The Model Survey allows universities to treat nonresponse as evidence
of lack of interest so long as universities give students the opportunity to
respond to the survey, explain the purpose of the survey, and inform
students that they will consider nonresponse evidence of lack of interest."l 0
With these conditions satisfied, an institution can infer lack of interest from
nonresponse, which OCR frankly acknowledges "may be high with the e-mail
procedure.""'
In essence, the Model Survey allows universities to infer that a student's
nonresponse has significance and meaning-that it reflects a deliberate and
informed choice to waive the opportunity to respond affirmatively with
interest. In actuality, there is no way to know whether this is the case, or
whether other factors, particularly those associated with the manner in
which the Model Survey is distributed, explain the student's nonresponse.
This subpart explores some factors that are not associated with a student's
lack of interest that may cause her not to respond to the Model Survey.
"I didn't check my e-mail" College students spend more time online than
any other segment of the population.
Most of them check their e-mail

107.

See, e.g.,

108.

This decision to release a 100+ page "clarification" (including the Technical Manual

SABO

& GRANT, supra note 102, at 2-3; infraParts III.A.5 & III.B.

and User's Guide) without giving public notice or opportunity to comment defies the

Commission's recommendation that OCR make any future substantive adjustments to its
enforcement policy "through the normal federal rulemaking process." COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 6, at 33 (recommendation two).
109.

WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102.

110.

USER'S GUIDE, supra note 53, at 12.

111.
112.

2005 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20, at 7.
The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports that 86% of college students are

online. STEVE JONES ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, THE INTERNET GOES TO
COLLEGE: HOW STUDENTS ARE LIVING IN THE FUTURE WITH TODAY'S TECHNOLOGY 2 (2002),

availableat http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIPcollege-report.pdf.
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frequently." 3 Yet there is documented variation in the degree to which
college students use the Internet, including variation based on race and
class."14 Therefore, some students do not use the Internet regularly enough
for e-mail to be a reliable means of obtaining their participation in a survey.
Even though these students are likely to be a small fraction of the
undergraduate population as a whole, their lack of participation may be
significant. Collegiate women's sports teams frequently have fewer than
twenty players." 5 In that context, the difference between a university's
decision that there is sufficient interest and ability to sustain a viable
women's team in a particular sport could come down to the difference
between twelve students responding with interest and fifteen students
responding with interest." 6 When the number of "swing" students is that
low, even a small minority of students who do not respond for whatever
reason has the potential to affect the survey's results in a legally significant
way.
"I check e-mail, but not that account." Even among the high percentage of
students who use e-mail frequently, universities cannot be sure which e-mail
accounts they are using. Students might sign up for a commercial e-mail
account to use in addition to or instead of their college-provided e-mail
account. These students may check university accounts too infrequently to
timely respond to the Model Survey e-mail or e-mails following up with the
student's nonresponse. With free commercial e-mail accounts offering larger
inbox capacities, better reliability, and more effective technology for
blocking unsolicited mass e-mail or "spain,"" students have many reasons to
rely more heavily on a non-university account.
113. Seventy-two percent of students check their e-mail once a day. Id. Two-thirds have
more than one e-mail account. Id.
114. Kathleen Korgen et al., Internet Use Among College Students: Are There Differences by
Race/Ethnicity?, 5 ELECTRONICJ. SOC. (Mar. 2001) (providing statistical evidence of the "gap in
Internet use among the major racial and ethnic groups in the United States" and concluding
that the digital divide is "alive and well at colleges and universities, even when virtually all
college campuses now have Internet access for students").
115. For example, at the University of Iowa, women's teams in softball (18), volleyball (14),
basketball (15), field hockey (16), golf (8), cross country (18), gymnastics (13), and tennis (7)
all have fewer than twenty players. Only rowing (26), soccer (25), and swimming (23) have
more
than
twenty. See generally University of Iowa,
Official Athletic
Site,
http://hawkeyesports.com (last visitedJan. 19, 2006).
116. OCR does not say how many interested players are necessary to require an institution
to start a team (or club). In general, OCR will defer to the decisions of the athletic directors
and coaches, so long as the number of players chosen has some basis in factors such as "average
size of teams" in that sport, "rate of substitutions," variety of skills required, and "effective
practices." 2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 11.
117. See Matthew Hicks, AOL Readies Web E-Mail Contender, EWEEK.COM (Dec. 22, 2004),
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1745129,00.asp (describing efforts by AOL, Yahoo,
Google, and MSN to be competitive in the Web-based e-mail market); see also SABO & GRANT,
supranote 102, at 4 (suggesting that "frequent disruptions or periodic shutdowns" of campus email services can contribute to students' use of alternative commercial e-mail accounts).
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"My e-mail program thought it was spam." Commercial e-mail programs try
to filter unsolicited "spain," blocking the messages or cordoning them into a
separate folder. A conscientious student may route e-mail addressed to her
university account to the commercial account inbox that she checks
regularly, but that commercial account might interpret e-mail sent by the
university to large lists of students as spare.1"
"I'm a little busy right now." Although OCR suggests that e-mail is a
permissible method to garner survey participation, it only requires that
institutions use a method "designed to generate high response rates" that
give students an "easy opportunity to respond." 1 9 As an alternative to e-mail,
a school might choose "to administer the Model Survey as part of the
registration process whereby students must complete or actively bypass the
Model Survey to register for courses."12 0 However, this method also has
potential to generate less than full and careful participation in the survey.
Students often race to register for limited slots in popular courses. When
time is of the essence, even a student with genuine interest and ability to
participate in athletics might select the general "not interested" response121
to proceed with her course registration. A student's future opportunities to
participate in athletics should not hinge on her understandable-indeed,
commendable-decision to prioritize academics at that particular moment.
"I thought you meant 'athletics.' " Even if students receive the e-mail
inviting (or requiring) their participation in the Model Survey, some may
avoid participation if they misconstrue the survey's purpose. Based on its
title, a student could infer that an "Assessment of Students' Athletic Interests
and Abilities" only concerns intercollegiate sports, to the exclusion of
intramural and club sports, which are also part of the Model Survey's
scope. The fact that many colleges administer intercollegiate athletics out
of a department called "athletics" and intramurals and clubs out of a
department called "recreation1 2 3 could contribute to this misimpression.
Regardless of their interest in athletics, students who misperceive the nature
of the survey (as well as those who are busy, attitudinally predisposed against
cooperating with the administration, or pessimistically doubt that their
118. My personal experience routing e-mail sent to my cornell.edu address to my
yahoo.com address exemplifies this problem. E-mail from the university administration
frequently ends up in my yahoo.com inbox's unmonitored "bulk mail" folder, presumably
because, like spam, it is addressed to a long list of e-mail addresses.
119.
2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 6.
120. Id. at 7.
121.
Id.
122. SABO & GRANT, supranote 102, at 6.
123. For example, the University of Iowa's Department of Recreation Services administers
intramural and club sports separate from an Athletics Department reserved for intercollegiate
sports. The University of New Hampshire's Department of Campus Recreation does the same.
For a contrasting example, Cornell University has a single Department of Athletics and Physical
Education that administers teams at all levels of competition.
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response will make a difference) are unlikely to respond to the survey. Even
if the university continues to solicit their participation under its obligation to
"take[] reasonable steps to follow-up with students who do not respond," 2 4
these students might reflexively select the blanket "not interested" response
to avoid spending more time on a chore that they presume does not apply to
them.
2.

The Target Population Is Illogical

Under OCR's instructions, universities should only administer the
Model Survey to enrolled, full-time undergraduates (either women or the
entire student population). While this target population is sensible for
measuring interest in intramural and club sports, the existing student body
is not the population from which colleges and universities generally recruit
for their intercollegiate teams. 25
For a survey that aims to measure students' interests and abilities in
sports that a university does not already offer, 12 6 already-enrolled students
comprise an illogical target population. Common sense suggests that there is
a negative correlation between a student's high interest and ability in a
particular sport and the likelihood that she will enroll12 at a college that
does not provide the opportunity to play at the level she would like. I2 1 As a
result, survey results will only reflect the preferences of a population that is
self-selected to be satisfied with the university's existing athletic offerings.

124.

2005 CLARIFICATION, supranote 20, at 7.

125. As the Commission acknowledged, there is no statistical data about the relative rates of
recruited versus walk-on athletes. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. However, because
most schools in NCAA Division I and II use athletic scholarships to recruit players, the number
of scholarship players offers some indication of how prevalent recruiting is. According to the
NCAA, more than 117,000 of 223,000 student-athletes at Division I and II institutions receive
either partial or full athletic scholarships. See NCAA Membership Breakdown, http://
wwwl.ncaa.org/membership/membershipsvcs/membershipbreakdown.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2006); NCAA, Undergraduate Athletic Scholarships, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
scholarships/school.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). In addition, while Division III schools
(and the Ivy League in Division I) do not offer scholarships, they do recruit players. See NCAA,
2005-2006 DIVISION III COACHES RECRUITING GUIDE (2005), available at http://
ncaa.org/library/membership/recruitingguides/2005-06/2005-06-d3-recruit-guide.pdf.
126. To be clear, the Model Survey requires institutions to survey both about sports they
offer and sports they do not. However, the survey's only real effect is on opportunities that do
not exist; the survey results determine whether a university has to add them or whether it does
not.
127. Of course, factors like finances and geography limit students' agency in selecting a
college. But the students with the most options are often those with the most interest and
(especially) ability to play intercollegiate sports.
128. Moreover, a theory of postdecisional cognitive dissonance reduction could explain
why a student would not report any interest in a particular athletic opportunity that is not
offered at the school she chose to attend. See SCOTr PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OFJUDGMENT AND

DECISIONMAKING 28-29 (1993).
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3. Self-Assessment Is Slanted
After the Model Survey respondent selects the level of competition at
which she would ideally like to play, the survey asks her whether she has the
ability to play at that level or whether she would "have to develop the
ability. " 129
Social
structures that antinormalize women's athletic
• •.
130
participation
make women less likely to consider themselves "athletes,"
with the confidence in physical skill that the label requires. 3 Women are
likely to enter college with less prior athletic experience than men, making
them more3 2likely to underrate their ability even under optimal survey
conditions.

The Model Survey's response options further aggravate this problem.
Any aspiring athlete with even a modicum of humility is not going to arrive
at college assuming she already has what it takes to be competitive. She is
going to assume that to participate on a competitive varsity team, she must
pay her dues, work her way up, learn from the team veterans, and, in the
words of the Model Survey, "develop the ability" to play at that level. The fact
that university athletic teams routinely redshirt recruited players for a year
suggests that these are reasonable assumptions. Model Survey results will
thus underrepresent the number of interested athletes who believe they
have the ability to eventually play at the level of competition to which they
aspire. Survey results slanted in this way will further absolve universities with
disproportionate athletic offerings from having to add additional
opportunities for women at the highest-intercollegiate, varsity-level of
competition.
4.

The Model Survey Measures Stereotypes, Not Actual Interest

The Model Survey asks students to respond to questions about their
interests and abilities. T3 As long as there are fewer students who express
interest and ability in a particular sport than are necessary to sustain a team
(at whatever level of competition), an institution can use the Model Survey
results as evidence that its current offerings comply with Title IX.

129. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supranote 91, at 62.
130. See infra Part III(stating that the 2005 Clarification is a departure from structuralist
equality reflected in Title IX).
131. SABO & GRANT, supra note 102, at 2 (citing, for example, feminist legal scholar
Catharine MacKinnon's reluctance to call herself an "athlete" notwithstanding her regular
practice of tae kwon do).
132. Id. at 3; WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102.
133. A redshirted player practices with the team but does not play in competitions. A team
will redshirt freshmen players to improve their skills, while preserving the next four years of
NCAA eligibility. See NCAA, Student-Athlete Eligibility, http://www.ncaa.org/eligibility/faqs/
faqs.eligibilityseasons.html (last visitedJan. 19, 2005).
134. TECHNICAL MANUAL, supranote 91, at 62.
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Critics predict that the survey results will simply serve as an echo
chamber, "institutionaliz[ing] the very discrimination that is and has been
the basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports."13 5 The
stereotype that women are less interested and less capable of participating in
sports is what caused universities to offer disproportionately fewer female
opportunities in the first place. Circularly, the fact that women have fewer
opportunities to play competitive sports contributes to the stereotype that
they are less interested in doing so. Therefore, the "true extent" of women's
interests and abilities in athletics is obscured by the component of espoused
interest that is socially constructed by stereotypes of women's interests. 3 7 As
such, interest can neither be measured nor fairly employed as a benchmark
for compliance. This criticism, which addresses the 2005 Clarification's most
fundamental flaw, is the subject of a full analysis in the next Part.
III. 2005 CLARIFICATION IS A DEPARTURE FROM STRUCTURALIST EQUALITY
REFLECTED IN TITLE IX

The Model Survey's critics are correct to argue that relying on survey
responses to define the number of participation opportunities required
under Title IX will only reinforce the existing disparity in athletic
opportunities that institutions provide for men and women. For this
argument to have legal relevance beyond merely classifying the 2005
Clarification as a bad policy choice, this Part necessarily considers whether
the 2005 Clarification is a departure from the theory of equality reflected in
Title IX.
Title IX demands women's inclusion in all aspects of federally funded
education programs. 138 It forbids the exclusion of women from participation
and denial of benefits enjoyed by men. In that sense, Title IX reflects a
formal equality theory that was dominant among liberal feminists in the
1970s. 13 9 The goal of formal equality is gender-neutral policies that allow
women access to privileges on the same terms as men.1 40 Generally, though,
formal equality accepts that an individual is entitled to equal treatment only
to the extent she or he is similarly situated to a privileged group.' 4' In
135.

WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., COMPLIANCE LOOPHOLE, supra note 102.

136.
137.
138.

Id.

139.

MARY JO FESTLE, PLAYING NICE: POLITICS AND APOLOGIES IN WOMEN'S SPORTS

SABo & GRANT, supranote 102, at 2.

20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (2000).
111

(1996).
140. MICHAELJ. COZZILLIO & ROBERT L. HAYMANJR., SPORTS AND INEQUALITY 405 (2005).
141. Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U.
MICH.J.L. REFORM 13, 22, 25-26 (2000-2001); Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work:
JudicialInterpretationsof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raisingthe Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1749, 1806 (1990); Yuracko, supra note 15, at 734; Note, Cheeringon
Women and Girls in Sports: Using Title IX to Fight Gender Role Oppression, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1627,
1634 (1997) [hereinafter Note].
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determining whether an individual is so similarly situated, formal equality
roots out sex stereotypes and eliminates them as the basis for different
treatment. "Real" sex
differences, however, are a permissible basis for
142
different treatment.

As applied to athletic participation, a model of formal equality would
ensure that women who are interested in sports receive treatment similar to
men who are interested in sports, so long as "interest in sports" is a genuine,
innate sex difference. Therefore, formal equality requires consideration of
whether men's and women's relative athletic preference is a natural, and
thus permissible, basis for disparate treatment, or whether that gender
by social structures. This Article refers to the latter
difference is constructed
143
as structuralism.

The question of which gender differences are biological and which are
constructed is not amenable to an easy answer. 14 Absent proof that athletic
interest is innate, we must accept that traditional social structures that
marginalize women's athletic participation are responsible-to some
unquantifiable extent-for any reported lack of interest in athletics. When a
university proffers survey evidence demonstrating women students'
purported lack of interest to immunize its disproportionate athletic
opportunities from legal challenge, as the 2005 Clarification allows, it retains
its place among the social structures constructing that lack of interest in the
first place. Thus, the 2005 Clarification renders Title IX useless as an
antidiscrimination measure.
This Part first describes the medical, social, educational, and legal
structures that have effectively antinormalized women's participation in
sports. Second, it suggests that Title IX has accounted for the social
structures that operate to limit women's participation in sports. In
particular, the language of the three-prong policy, bolstered by the federal
appellate
courts'
interpretation,
deliberately
makes
prong-three
compliance-the only measure that looks at women's interests and
abilities-a difficult and unstable measure of compliance. As the courts
explain, this is because interest-defined compliance depends on socially
constructed stereotypes, and not on women's actual interests. Because
prong-two compliance, which examines history and continuing practice of
program expansion, is equally unsustainable, 4 5 OCR and the courts had
appropriately engineered a three-prong policy that actually has a
proportionality-seeking effect.

142. CozzILuo & HAYMAN, supra note 140, at 405 (defining structuralism and contrasting it
with formal equality).
143. Id.
144. See Steven Pinker, Why NatureandNurture Won't Go Away, DAEDALUS, Fall 2004, at 5.
145. See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
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Third, this Part argues that the 2005 Clarification abandons Title IX's
underlying structuralism in two related ways. First, in light of the cultural
history described in Part III.A, a survey of women's interests in athletics is
likely, to some unknowable degree, to measure women's responses to (or
accommodation of) constructed antinormalization of women's athletic
participation rather than some essential lack of desire to participate to the
same extent as men. Moreover, it provides universities with an easier way to
comply with Title IX's requirements than substantial proportionality. Prior
to 2005, OCR and the federal courts had employed a structuralist rationale
to make the third prong into a tough, unstable measure of compliance. By
allowing reported interest levels to define equality, the 2005 Clarification
strips the three-prong test of its power to push institutions toward
proportionality, which had ensured that they could not get too comfortable
with prong-three compliance.
Finally, even if interest in athletics appropriately limits the class of men
and women who are "similarly situated" for the purposes of achieving formal
equality, OCR's new approach does not actually provide similar treatment to
sports-interested women as to sports-interested men. Currently enrolled
women must prove their interests and abilities in nonexistent opportunities
to receive a proportionate share of athletic opportunities. In contrast,
coaches and administrators will continue to recruit interested and capable
male athletes to fill existing opportunities. The 2005 Clarification therefore
fails, under any measure, as an anti-discrimination policy.
A.

THE ANTINORMALIZA TION OF WOMEN IN SPORTS

History shows that our culture has been anything but gender neutral in
its relationship to sports. The medical establishment, religious and moral
views, educational values, and law have each contributed to the pervasive
societal view of sports as a masculine realm. Within this context, women's
participation in sports defies gender normativity. Women who do play sports
exhibit apologetic or compensatory behavior, which helps demonstrate, and
more importantly, perpetuate the idea that femininity and athletics are
mutually exclusive. Even in our Title IX world, society sends women and
girls clear and subtle signals that their participation in athletics is abnormal.
In fact, Title IX, both the law itself as well as the backlash against it,
contributes to this perception. This antinormalization suppresses women's
athletic interest and participation.
1.

Medical and Moral Structures

The muscular Christianity movement, imported from Europe in the
mid-nineteenth century, introduced Americans to the idea that sports were
integral to the development of men, who society worried were becoming too

SURVEYSAYS...

effeminized by their increasing employment in white-collar jobs that did not
require physical labor. 146 Athletics, which developed "physical presence, stoic
courage in the endurance of pain, and judgment under pressure," were
deliberately touted as the antidote to this perceived weakness.14 7 In this
context, participating in athletics was as much about defining what it means
to be a man as what it means to be not a woman. Reclaiming
masculinity
14
8
women.
of
exclusion
the
required
therefore
sports
through
Biological differences between men and women provided a more
acceptable rationale for excluding women from sports. The medical
establishment considered it unhealthy for women to exercise during
menstruation and warned that those who did so put their prized fertility at
risk. 149 Other medical excuses, such as the theory that women were allocated
a fixed amount of physical energy that had to be reserved for reproductive
functions, also contributed to the biological basis for constructing the
prevailing view that men's participation in sports was natural and women's
was not.150 From the late 1800s through the 1940s, conventional medical
advice warned that exercise, or too much exercise, put women at risk of
uterine displacement, malformed breasts, and menstrual and childbirth
complications. 5 1 These theories gave rise to the emerging-and enduringmyth of female fragility.
Though the medical establishment came to

146. SUSAN K. CAHN, COMING ON STRONG: GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
WOMEN'S SPORT 11 (1994); David Whitson, Sport in the Social Construction of Masculinity, in
SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER: CRITICAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 19, 21 (Michael A.
Messner & Donald F. Sabo eds., 1990) [hereinafter SPORT, MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER].
147.

Whitson, supranote 146, at 21.

148. FIELDS, supra note 35, at 154-55; Whitson, supra note 146, at 24 ("A proving ground
for masculinity can only be preserved by the exclusion of women from the activity."). Catharine
MacKinnon offers a different, though related, theory. See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Women, Self-Possession, and Sport (1982), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW
117 (1987). Like harassment, rape, and the relegation of women to the private sphere,
excluding women from sports is another means of establishing-and perpetuating-women's

subordinate status to men. Id. Because an athletic woman possesses physical power and strength
and an awareness of body and self, she is less susceptible to men's dominance. Id. The
construction of hegemonic masculinity of sport was no benign accident, but rather, it was an
intentional rendering of women as accessible, passive, and "rapeable." Id.
149.
FIELDS, supra note 35, at 2; JENNIFER HARGREAVES, SPORTING FEMALES: CRITICAL ISSUES
IN THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF WOMEN'S SPORTS 43 (1994); HELEN LENSKYJ, OUT OF
BOUNDS: WOMEN, SPORT AND SEXUALITY 25-27 (1986) (describing the "sacred" and "patriotic"
status of motherhood that gave rise to such concerns).

150. HARGREAVES, supra note 149, at 45. In contrast, it was believed that in men, athletic
activity rejuvenated the body's energy reserves to aid the production of sperm. Todd Crosset,
Masculinity, Sexuality and the Development of Early Modern Sport, in SPORT, MEN AND THE GENDER
ORDER, supra note 146, at 52.
151. LENSKYJ, supra note 149, at 20, 27-29. These concerns appeared to be limited to
physical exertion on a recreational basis. The physical demands of housework did not give rise
to similar threats. Id. at 29.
152. Id. at 19-20.
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accept that certain limited physical activity was acceptable and healthy for
women, 5 3 medical arguments helped sustain the exclusion of
women and
5 4
girls from the more physical and aggressive sports for decades.
Victorians isolated women from the exciting frenzy of sports in order to
preserve their chastity.1 5 In the 1920s and 1930s, society criticized the
bobbed-hair, boyish-looking flappers who began to challenge these
restrictions as hypersexual. 56 Later, as society became increasingly awareand apprehensive-of its gay subculture, the fear that sports lead to sexual
57
promiscuity was replaced by a fear that they lead to sexual deviance.1
Engaging in activity that embodied aggressiveness, competitiveness, and
perseverance-values already appropriated as masculine-female athletes'
perceived "mannishness" made them vulnerable to the charge of being, at
best, unfeminine, and at worst, lesbians. I15 Neither charge was very good for
a woman's marriage prospects. 159 Both flew in the face of the Cult of True
Womanhood, the dominant social view that as men's wage labor moved out
of the home and into the public sphere, women's role was to remain in the
home and raise the children. I6° Historian MaryJo Festle sums up the social
forces deterring women's participation in sports in the early half of the
twentieth century: "Conservative ideas about gender combined with sports'

153. See id. at 24, 33. This realization was due, in large part, to the contributions of women
in the medical field. Id. at 25-27.

154. See, e.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 364 F. Supp. 1212, 1216-17 (W.D.
Pa. 1973) (denying an equal protection claim arising from a municipal baseball league's
exclusion of girls as rationally related to medical and safety concerns); Suzanne Sangree, Title
IX and the Contact Sports Exemption: GenderStereotypes in a Civil Rights Statute, 32 CONN. L. REv. 381,
421-30 (2000) (describing the frailty rationale for the exclusion of women and girls from

contact and noncontact sports). Medical beliefs, such as the perceived link between jumping
and uterine displacement, also resulted in modified rules for girls' basketball. See LENSKYJ, supra
note 149, at 28; infranotes 190-91 and accompanying text.
155. See CAHN, supra note 146, at 165-66. The Victorians even feared the "undercurrent of
sexual excitement" in the game of croquet. ALLEN GuTTMAN, WOMEN'S SPORTS: A HISTORY 119
(1991).
156. CAHN, supra note 146, at 165-66 (explaining that "[b]etween 1900 and 1930 the
sexual debate in sport centered on the problem of unbridled heterosexual desire").
157. Id. at 164-68 (explaining that the derogatory term for female athletes of the day,
'muscle moll," invoked an image of "promiscuous working-class sexuality" and prostitution).
158. Id. at 164-66; FESTLE, supranote 139, at 22; LENSKYJ, supra note 149, at 74-76.
159. GUTrMAN, supra note 155, at 95 ("Sports, however, were thought by many to spoil a
girl's looks, to diminish her charm, and thus to hamper her in the all-important race to
matrimony."); LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 74 (describing how women who "lacked the feminine
traits of emotionalism, passivity, and helplessness that validated masculine identity" were
portrayed as "unappealing" to men).
160. Sangree, supra note 154, at 402. The same social forces operated to encourage boys to
play sports, which were believed to compensate for the feminizing effect of spending so much
time with their mothers in the absence of their working fathers. Id,at 402-03.
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historic association with masculinity
in a powerful one-two punch knocking
16
most women out of sports."'

2.

The Role of Women Physical Educators

The physical education programs that colleges and universities
developed in the early half of the twentieth century contributed to women's
(and society's) attitudes about sports. Buoyed by the medical establishment's
changing views on women's physical activity, 162 female professional physical
educators picked up the mantle and started implementing physical
education curricula for their female students. Still, criticism that such efforts
"risked their [students'] modesty, mental health, and maternal capacity "161_
and influence'
as well as the educators' own tenuous positions of power
•
165
forced them to espouse a "moderated" athletics regimen for women.
The women who controlled the physical education curricula at colleges
and universities created programs for female students that were markedly
different from the programs offered to male students. They promoted the
ideal of a generalist "sportswoman," a woman who was reasonably competent
in a variety of sports and games, rather than that of an "athlete" who
specialized in one or few sports. 66 They emphasized companionship over
competition and endeavored to protect women from exploitation. 67 These
values were incompatible with varsity-type athletics programs that set rosters,
regular practices, and a schedule of extramural play.6
Instead, the educators favored intramural matchups, which were free
from the public gaze, and the occasional extracurricular "play day" that
mitigated competition by creating ad-hoc teams mixing women from the

161. FESTLE, supra note 139, at 7. Given the context of this Article, it is worth noting that
Festle cites the results of an interest survey administered by an Ohio State graduate student in
1958. d. at 295 n.13. The most common reasons that the survey respondents gave for their
reluctance to participate in sports "demonstrated their sensitivity to sports' unfeminine
reputation:" muscles, masculinity, moral and ethical transgressions, bad taste, and societal
disapproval. Id.
162. CAHN, supra note 146, at 12 (explaining that doctors also came to believe that young
women's exercise was good preparation for the physicality of childbearing); HARGREAVES, supra
note 149, at 60 (noting that doctors began prescribing moderate exercise regimens for women
after concluding that sedentary lifestyles were unhealthy).
163. CAHN, supranote 146, at 22.
164. As women, their status within the academy was lower than men's, and their field,
physical education, did not enjoy the prestige of academic disciplines. FESTLE, supranote 139, at
25. In light of their low status and the fact that they promoted behavior that was only
"marginally acceptable" for women, women physical educators' conservative philosophy can be
interpreted as pragmatic self-preservation, d. Their jobs depended on their ability to ensure
that their students portrayed a socially acceptable image. Id.
165. CAHN, supranote 146, at 23.
166. Id. at 64-65; FESTLE, supra note 139, at 12; GUTrMAN, supranote 155, at 139.
167. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 11-12.
168. Id. at 16.
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different schools. 16 9 They also favored sports that society recognized as
acceptable for women (especially educated, upper- and middle-class women)
such as "country club" sports, which women could play with their future
171
170
These sports, like golf, tennis, swimming, and badminton,
husbands.
were less sweaty and void of physical contact.
In retrospect, it seems ironic and unfortunate that it was female physical
educators who zealously implemented and defended a curriculum that
demonstrably repressed women's athletic abilities and interest in
"disfavored" sports. 172 But as much as the educators' value choices
contributed to a limited and qualified normative view of women and sports,
these values were themselves a likely product of that normative view.' 73 The
educators could not offer competitive varsity programs in team sports
because their institutions did not budget enough money for uniforms, did
not give them any equipment, gave men's teams priority in all practice1 fields
75
174
and facilities, and did not hire enough staff to coach women's teams.
The educators' generalist values and adamant intramural philosophy
may have been a rationalization of the fact that they could not offer an
alternative. 176 Their decision to favor companionate and non-exertive sports
over competitive, physical, or contact sports may have been a pragmatic
response to society's view of certain sports as unfeminine, a choice to protect
the limited opportunities they could offer from backlash that would surely
accompany a decision to push the envelope.' 77 Historian Mary Jo Festle
surmises that the conservative philosophy of female physical educators, itself
an "accommodation to prejudice against female athletes," perpetuated that
very prejudice by reinforcing society's regard of a woman athlete as
"inappropriate and unfeminine."' 78 She continues: "It fed more fuel to the
cycle, begun in the late 1920s in which women chose not to aspire
79
athletically because it was unusual; then it remained unusual."'
A

169.

CAHN, supra note 146, at 66; FESTLE, supra note 139, at 15; GurTMAN, supra note 155,

at 136-37, 140-41.
170. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 11-12, 23.
171. Id.at 11-12. Festle also reports that physical educators used women's responses to
interest surveys to justify their decisions to de-emphasize sports like track and field. Id. at 11.
The environment in which these women developed their sports preferences was adorned with
posters warning women students: "'Don't Be a Muscle Moll.'" Id. at 22.
172.

Id. at 16-17.

173.

See id at 19.

174.

Id. At the University of North Carolina, for example, the only outdoor facility that was

available for any women's team was the football field-the end zone only!-when no men's
team was using it. Id.
175.
FESTLE, supranote 139, at 18-19.
176. Id.at 19.
177. Id. at 20-21.
178. Id. at26.
179. Id
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Modified Sports and Apologetic Behavior

Notwithstanding the purported health risks, educators' early efforts to
restrict women's opportunities in competitive and physical sports, and the
widespread and growing belief that the "athletic woman" was oxymoronic,
women did in fact play sports throughout the twentieth century.18 0 Schools,
industrial leagues, and community leagues provided women and girls the
chance to participate in basketball and track. The Amateur Athletic Union
sponsored many women's tournaments, including track and field,
swimming, gymnastics, basketball, and handball.18 There were even
semiprofessional opportunities for women basketball and baseball players.182
Opportunities at the college level also began to improve toward the end
of the 1950s as the female physical educators embraced a more
comprehensive and competitive sports curriculum-partially in response to
social and political pressure attributable to the Cold War."" Nationalistic
pride incited the drive to earn more medals than Russia at the 1956 and
1960 Olympic Games, fueling a cultural acceptance and encouragement of
female athletes. I1 4 The newly formed U.S. Olympic Development Committee
and the President's Council on Youth sought to expand girls' and women's
physical-education curricula to raise the general fitness level among
women.18 5 The organizations also aimed to identify and support rising
athletic stars. 186 This cultural shift compelled or freed female physical
educators to endorse physical sports for women, including gymnastics, track
and field, and basketball. 187 Eventually, the shift led educators to create an
organization to sponsor intercollegiate tournaments. 188
Yet even within these opportunities, women's participation was qualified
in ways that reinforced the hegemonic masculinity of sports. First, even
though women played and excelled in all kinds of sports, far fewer women
did so than men."89 Also, some sports employed different rules for women

180.

FESTLE, supra note 139, at 32.

181. GUTTMAN, supranote 155, at 138.
182. CAHN, supra note 146, at 142-53 (describing the All-American Girls Professional
Baseball League, which operated from 1943 through 1954); GUTTMAN, supra note 155, at 211
12; MAX McELWAIN, THE ONLY DANCE IN IOWA: A HISTORY OF SIX-PLAYER GIRLS' BASKETBALL

72-73, 121 (2004) (describing barnstorming semi-professional women's basketball teams).
183. CAHN, supranote 146, at 130-31; FESTLE, supra note 139, at 94-97.
184.

FESTLE, supra note 139, at 89.

185. Id. at 89-90.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 96.
188. Id. The female physical educators did not share or espouse the government's goal of
beating the Russians and continued to deemphasize the importance of winning. lI at 96-97.
189. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-13. The Commission acknowledged
discriminatory practices in the pre-Title IX era that denied intercollegiate and interscholastic
athletic opportunities to female students and resulted in much lower participation rates among
women. Id. For example, in the 1966-1967 school year, 15,182 women competed in
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that made the game less physical and virtually contact-free. Girls' basketball,
for example, limited players to half- or third-court zones, though under
some rules one player, a rover, could run the full court.' 90 Girls were limited
in the number of times they could dribble before passing to a teammate.
Fouling was more severely punished than in the boys' game. These
modifications set the girls' game apart from the "regular" version of the
game that boys played. In this way, girls' rules were both produced by and
contributed to the idea that women were not fully capable athletes.' 9'
Another difference between men's and women's sports was-and continues
to be "-the lack of media coverage and public attention. 19 With some
exceptions-rural Iowa, for example, where communities' enthusiasm and
'
support for girls' high school basketball equaled or rivaled that for boys ,194
women's basketball, especially the adult amateur game, was not widely
publicized. 195 Historians suggest that this silence suppressed participation by
keeping women from finding out about opportunities to play, and it also
contributed to the normative view that women were not athletes.' 96
In addition to having distinctly different participation rates, rules, and
status in the popular culture, women's participation in sports is modified by
its deference to "compulsory" norms of femininity and heterosexuality.' 9vTo
dodge the lesbian epithet'9" and the related, constructed paradox of the

intercollegiate sports, compared to 151,918 men. Id at 13. There was a similar ten-fold disparity
in the gender breakdown of high school athletes in the early 1970s. Id.
190. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 31-32; MCELWAIN, supranote 182, at 6.
191. LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 28.
192. A recent study shows that the alarmingly low percentage of local news sports
broadcasts devoted to women's sports fifteen years ago (about 5%) is not much higher (only
about 6%) today. The study also reports a 20:1 ratio of men's to women's sports coverage on
the national channel ESPN. The researchers also note occasional instances (though more rare
than in previous studies) in which coverage of women's sports sexualized or trivialized women.
MARGARET CARLISLE DUNCAN & MICHAEL A. MESSNER, GENDER IN TELEVISED SPORTS: NEWS AND

HIGHLIGHTS SHOWS, 1989-2004, at 4-5 (July 2005), available at http://www.aafla.org/garr/

research reports/tv2004.pdf.
193. FESTLE, supranote 139, at xxiv, 91-94.
194. MCELWAIN, supranote 182, at 9.
195. FESTLE, supranote 139, at 41-42.
196. Id. at 53 ("According to sports pages, coaches, rulebooks, Library of Congress
headings, and the popular mind, it was not 'basketball'-it was 'girls basketball.' The word
basketball connoted boys' basketball, just as an athlete referred to a male unless otherwise
qualified.").
197. See generally FESTLE, supra note 139, at 45-46; LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 73-107.
198. See generally PAT GRIFFIN, STRONG WOMEN, DEEP CLOSETS: LESBIANS AND HOMOPHOBIA
IN SPORT 68-78 (1998) (describing women's sports' deliberate effort to promote a heterosexual
and heterosexy image to negate lesbians' perceived and actual presence). For a recent, specific
example of this phenomenon, see Complaint, Harris v. Portland, Civ. A. No. 05-2648 (M.D. Pa.
Dec. 21, 2005).Jennifer Harris, a former Penn State basketball player, alleged that coach Rene
Portland forced her off the team because Portland perceived that she is a lesbian. Complaint,
supra, at 3, 12-20; see also Genaro C. Armas, PSUBasketball Coach Denies New Accusations, CENTRE
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99

women in sports have been subject to, complied with,

and promoted efforts to portray traditional female attributes like grace,
beauty, and desire for men.200 State and national tournaments no longer
include beauty pageants,2 ' and compulsory grooming and etiquette
classes 02 have also fallen out of favor. But media coverage and organized
promotion of women's sports continues to emphasize the ways in which
female athletes demonstrate

culturally accepted female attributes and

behavior.' °3 Less subtly, female athletes who do not conform to the feminine
DAILY TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at BI (quoting Harris as charging that Portland "continually

harassed me to change my appearance and my image because she thought I was not 'feminine'
enough"). Portland claims that her decision to dismiss Harris was a "basketball decision,"
Armas, supra, at BI, even though Harris started in twenty-two of thirty games in the 2004-2005
season and had the highest scoring record among the players on the team who were eligible to
return in the 2005-06 season. Complaint, supra,at 22-23. Portland has long been renowned for
her negative recruiting tactics and anti-lesbian policy. See Bill Figel, Lesbians in World ofAthletics,
CHI. SUN-TIMES,June 16, 1986, at 119 ("One of the first things Penn State coach Rene Portland

brings up during a recruiting visit with a prospective player and her parents is lesbian activity. 'I
will not have it in my program,' Portland said.").
199. MacKinnon, supra note 148, at 120 ("Femininity has contradicted, masculinity has
been consistent with, being athletic. Women get to choose between being a successful girl and a
successful athlete."). MacKinnon suggests that the lesbian epithet helps construct the
connection between women's athletic strength and sexual inaccessibility. Id. at 122. This
explains why the epithet is used to suppress-or at least demand apologetic behavior as the
price for-women's participation in sports. Id.
200. See FESTLE, supra note 139, at 45.
201. Id. at 49-50 (describing the player beauty pageant at the AAU women's basketball
tournament); CAHN, supranote 146, at 135-36; McELWAIN, supra note 182, at 49-50, 91, 95-96
(describing the "health contest" that was a component of the Iowa high school state
tournament program until the 1940s, as well as the annual designated "cover girl"
photographed for the tournament guide until 1992).
202. CAHN, supranote 146, at 156 (describing the All-American Girls' Professional Baseball
League's compulsory charm school); LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 82.
203. Alina Bernstein, Is It Timefor a Victory Lap? Changes in Media Coverage of Women in Sport,
37 INT'L REV. SOC. SPORT 415, 420-21 (2002) (documenting various "different practices by

which the media trivialize, and therefore undermine, women's athletic achievements, thus
constructing female athleticism as not only 'other than' but as 'lesser than' the male's"
including instances of sexual objectification, infantilization, and trivialization of women
athletes); Susan Tyler Eastman & Andrew C. Billings, Sportscastingand Sports Reporting: The Power
of Gender Bias, 24 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 192, 208-210 (2000) (documenting gender bias in
sports commentary, including that "the dating habits and families of women athletes were
referred to more frequently than those of men"); Michael A. Messner et al., Silence, Sports Bras,
and Wrestling Porn: Women in Televised Sports and Highlights Shows, 27 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 38,
47-49 (2003) (concluding that sportscasters devote most of their "sparse" coverage of women's
sports to sexualizing female athletes and using them as the brunt ofjokes).
This is no modern trend; throughout the history of women's sports, its coverage and
promotion has attempted to normalize athletic participation by emphasizing the "female" in
"female athlete." FESTLE, supra note 139, at 48-49 (describing efforts of the Amateur Athletic
Union in the 1950s to normalize women's athletic participation by emphasizing their desire for
motherhood and marriage); LENSKVJ, supranote 149, at 75 (describing efforts of "well-meaning
journalists" in the 1930s to portray female athletes as "having lost none of their femininity" by
describing them as "sweet and ladylike," groomed and attractive); MaryJo Kane, The Post Title IX
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heterosexual idea are shunned and ostracized. °4 Both practices reinforce
the social construct of a female athlete as a lesser or qualified version of a
"normal" male athlete, which is also reflected in the resulting "apologetic
behavior" of female athletes. Female athletes consciously or unconsciously
endeavor to "minimiz[e] the perceived violation of social norms" as the price
for playing sports. 205 Apologetic behavior may be evident when, for example,
girls take up cheerleading, which is culturally perceived as an acceptable
feminine activity, 2 6 either as "cover" for, or an alternative to, activity that is
more readily perceived as athletic.2° 7 Or when players don makeup and wear

their hair long.0 8 Or when women espouse preferences for male over female
coaches 209 or for the gendered team nicknames--- la "Lady Volunteers"
210
that reinforce the assumption that athletics, unqualified, is male.
Apologetic behavior thus demonstrates not only the pressure women feel to
participate in society's efforts to reduce the cognitive dissonance inherent in

FemaleAthlete in the Media,J. PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREATION & DANCE, Mar. 1989, at 58 (depicting
a 1989 media guide at Northwestern Louisiana State in which the women's basketball team
posed with bunny ears and tails under the caption, "These Girls Can Play, Boy").
204. GRIFFIN, supranote 198, at 86 (describing how the lesbian epithet is used to "control,
discredit, and intimidate women in sport"); Don Sabo & Sue CurryJensen, Prometheus Unbound:
Constructionsof Masculinity in Sports Media, in MEDIASPORT 213-14 (Lawrence A. Wenner ed.,
1998) (pointing out examples of lesbian-baiting by the sports media and arguing that the
practice "preserves the male hegemony in sport and society"). For an historic example of this
trend, see LENSKYJ, supra note 149, at 85 (attributing efforts by female educators to screen out
erstwhile physical education majors of "masculine-type" to a fear of "guilt by association").
205. FESTLE, supra note 139, at 45; id. at 46 ("Historians cannot know the full extent to
which stigma constrained a woman athlete. After all, plenty of women played despite it. Still, the
prevalence of public apologetic behavior among female athletes is a trend that both academics
and athletes have long acknowledged."); see also CAHN, supranote 146, at 145.
206. See, e.g., Laurel R. Davis, Male Cheerleaders and the Naturalization of Gender, in SPORT,
MEN, AND THE GENDER ORDER, supranote 146, at 153, 154.
207. LENSKYJ, supranote 149, at 103; Note, supra note 141, at 1632.
208. Note, supra note 141, at 1632-33; id. at 1632 ("One need only count the number of
female athletes who wear their hair long and in ponytails . . . to see that these instances are not
isolated ones."). Relatedly, every single player in the 2005 Women's College World Series had
long hair, and a majority of players wore makeup. One could suppose that such uniform and
prevalent self-sexualization in today's college softball is deliberate compensation for softball's
historic association with lesbians.
In 2004, the U.S. Women's National Soccer Team named their official fan club the
"Ponytail Posse." The players explain that the name is "meant to convey the combination of
femininity and athleticism that is inherent in putting your hair up in a ponytail." See Ponytail
Posse, http://ponytailposse.com/handler.cfm?cat-id=171827catid=17183 (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
209. GRIFFIN, supra note 198, at 84; Kristine E. Newhall, Quality on Ice: Gender and
Coaching in Women's Ice Hockey (May 4, 2004) (unpublished master's thesis, Simmons
College) (on file with author) (finding evidence of this attitude among college women hockey
players).
210. Brake, supra note 141, at 110-11. Whether it is the Nittany Lions versus the Lady Lions
or the Final Four versus the Women's Final Four, the lopsided use of gender qualifiers
contributes to the construction of athletics that are, by default, masculine. See id.
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the constructed paradox of the women athlete but also of the very existence
of that cultural construction.
4.

Title IX and Its Backlash

Title IX has increased opportunities for women's athletic participation
over the last thirty years and has positively influenced women's interests and
abilities in sports.21 At the same time, some aspects of the law itself, as well
as society's reaction to it, have contributed to the antinormalization of
women's sports. This subpart examines Title IX's antinormalization of
women's sports in the following major areas: contact sports, expenditures,
and scholarships. It analyzes how society's backlash against the opportunities
that Title IX has provided to female students furthers this antinormalization.
a.

Contact Sports

The Tide IX implementing regulations require schools that do not offer
a women's team in a particular sport to allow women to try out for a men's
team in that sport.'1 This provision is qualified, however, by an exception
for all contact sports. A school must let a woman 2 1 try out for the only tennis

211.
See generally Trudy Saunders Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years Under Title IX: Have We Made
Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1107 (1998); Note, supra note 141, at 1640-41; COMMISSION
REPORT, supranote 6, at 10 ("I was here in 1972 when there was really no interest on the part of
girls to participate, and the high school participation at that time was 8%. The schools were
forced to offer opportunity, and my goodness, it's now up to 42 percent.") (quoting Christine
Grant, Associate Professor and former Athletic Director, University of Iowa).
212. This regulation, titled "Separate Teams," reads in full:
Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section [prohibiting
gender discrimination in interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics], a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport. However, where the recipient operates or sponsors a
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.
For the purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice
hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of which
involves bodily contact.
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2005).
213. The regulation refers not to women but to members of the sex whose athletic
opportunities have been previously limited. Id. Courts have rejected a sport-specific
construction of "previously limited athletic opportunities" advanced by men attempting to
integrate women's field hockey teams. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 174-75
(3d Cir. 1993); Kleczek v. R.I. Interscholastic League, Inc., 768 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (D.R.I.
1991). In both cases, the court held that, even if the plaintiffs satisfied the previously limited
athletic opportunities requirement, field hockey's status as a contact sport thwarted efforts for
relief. Williams, 998 F.2d at 173-74 (finding enough evidence to preclude plaintiffs' summary
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or swimming team it offers, but when it comes to football, basketball,
baseball, ice hockey, rugby, wrestling, or boxing-the contact sports
enumerated in the regulations-schools can bar women from trying out for
the only team. 214 Further, while a school may opt to add a women's
basketball or hockey team to improve its proportionality numbers, it has no
obligation to do so unless women can demonstrate that there is enough
interest on campus to field an entire, reasonably competitive team.215 By
allowing schools to exclude women from playing contact sports with men,
the regulation reflects an assumption that women are too weak and frail to
play with men 2l--an
assumption that is sometimes accompanied by express
rhetoric relegating contact sports to an exclusively male domain.217
Moreover, the regulation's failure to require schools to provide
equivalent teams for the women who are excluded from participating on
men's teams contributes to association of those sports with masculinity. This
message is further amplified by the regulation's distinctly different
treatment of noncontact sports, under which schools are required to give
women opportunities to participate. 2181 In these various ways, the regulation
"locks in place the construction of particular sports as masculine and

judgment); Kleczek, 768 F. Supp. at 955-56 (holding that field hockey's incidental bodily contact
renders it a contact sport).
214. See, e.g.,
George, supra note 32, at 1114-15. Even though schools are not obligated
under Title IX to let women try out for men's teams in contact sports, a state-sponsored
educational institution's failure to do so may violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Fortin
v. Darlington Little League, 514 F.2d 344, 344 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that a Little League, a
state actor, could not categorically exclude girls); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 164
(D. Colo. 1977) (holding that a high school could not constitutionally exclude a girl from the
only boy's soccer team on the basis of gender alone); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396, 1400
(N.D. Ohio 1974) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause required a municipal football
league to let a qualified girl play).
215. 1996 CLARIFICATION, supra note 15; see also Brake, supra note 141, at 139-40 (calling
this a "modest concession" because "[flew female athletes will be able to affirmatively
demonstrate enough interest and ability to support a viable team in a contact sport [in which
they] have been denied access to any school-supported competition").
216. Brake, supra note 141, at 145 (citing Sangree, supra note 154, at 434-35); see also
FIELDS, supra note 35, at 161 (suggesting that "[t]he [regulation's] exclusion of females from
contact sports was symbolic of the exclusion of females from power").
217. For example, University of Iowa Head Football Coach Kirk Ferentz deflected criticism
of a personal foul penalty called against his linebacker: "That's football. We're not wearing
skirts .... Believe me, if he wanted to drill him he could have drilled him." Andrew Logue,
Criticized Hawkeyes FireBack, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 9, 2005, at Cl. Along the same lines, the
University of Iowa's decision to accommodate opposing football teams in an all-pink visitors'
locker room-described by one reporter as "Barbie's Dream House on acid"-is a symbolic
gesture of the same point that contact sports like football and femininity are mutually exclusive.
See Sean Keeler, Hayden Lives On: Visitors' QuartersStill Pretty in Pink, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 21,
2005 (describing the pink locker room).
218. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2005).
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feminine,
and bolsters the construction of a dominant masculinity in
219
sport."

b. Expenditures on Sports Teams
The regulations allow schools to continue to heap large sums of money
and favorable treatment on men's teams. This sends clear signals to
women about how much less their participation is, literally, valued. The
regulations expressly state that OCR will not judge compliance with the
equal-opportunity requirement by whether a school makes equal aggregate
expenditures to its men's and women's programs. 22° Thus, the
implementing regulations to Title IX do nothing to close the persisting gap
between the operating budgets for men's and women's sports. 221
The regulations enumerate the factors OCR will consider in
determining whether schools are providing equal treatment to their men's
and women's athletics programs-factors such as travel and per diem
expenses, compensation of coaches, and housing and dining services. 222
However, the regulations do not require men's and women's programs to
match up evenly in these areas. OCR explains that not requiring equal
aggregate expenditures allows universities to take into account "unique
aspects of particular sports or athletic activities" 223 when setting budgets for
men's and women's programs. In other words, some sports are just
inherently more expensive than others, and universities should have the
flexibility to account for this. But as a result of this regulatory choice,
universities have no legal incentive to eliminate disparities in coaching
salaries, 224 equipment room access, number of training tables, and other
indicia of quality of athletic opportunities that are available to female

219. Brake, supra note 141, at 140.
220. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
221. Division I schools spend nearly twice as much-on average, almost $3 million moreon men's sports than on women's sports. Women, on average, make up 54% of the enrolled
student population. Welch Suggs, Some Men's Teams Are in Perilin Division I-A, CHRON. HIGHER
EDuC.,June 18, 2004, at A34 tbl. 1; see also Welch Suggs, Small Colleges Spent 41% of Sports Budgets
on Women's Teams, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,June 18, 2004, at A35 tbl.1 (reporting that colleges in
NCAA Division III, where women comprise an average of 58% of the student population,
collectively spend only 41% of their athletic budgets on women's sports, about $137,000 less
than they spend on men's).
222. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2)-(10).
223. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 9, at 71,415 (acknowledging that "for the most
part these factors will occur in programs offering football, and consequently these differences
will favor men").
224. Suggs, Gender Quotas, supra note 71, at A24 (reporting that, at schools in NCAA
Division I-A, men's teams have one and a half times as many coaches, and those coaches make
more than twice what women's coaches make).
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athletes today. 22' Female athletes and outside observers may read these
inequities, in the aggregate, as institutionalizing the inferior status of
women's sports.
c.

Scholarships

The regulations measure scholarship equity by whether the share of
women's S•• scholarships
is proportionate to women's overall athletic
226
participation.
A school may provide relatively fewer scholarships for
female athletes as long as it provides them relatively fewer opportunities
overall. By one report, women receive $142 million less in scholarships than
men. 22 7 This disparity puts an actual dollar value on how much less
institutions "value" female athletes, and it does so permissibly under Title
IX. These disparities "reinforce[] notions of male entitlement" in
athletics. 22s As signals of women's athletics relative

(lower) value,

the

disparity in scholarship money "contribute [s]
to the construction of interest
2 29
in sport in a way that is not gender neutral."
d. Backlash Against Title IX
To the extent that Title IX does compel or at least motivate schools to
close the gap in participation between men and women, such progress is
accompanied by backlash that (often intentionally) reinforces the gender
hierarchy of sports.13 Pervasive rhetoric maintains that Title IX is "reverse
discrimination 2 1' that benefits female athletes only at the expense of
men. 232 This erroneous 233 belief has fueled political and judicial challenges

225.

E.g., UNIV. OF IOWA, 2004-2005 DIVISION I ATHLETICS CERTIFICATION SELF-STUDY

INSTRUMENT 52, 55-59 (2005), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/-our/ncaa-cert/steering/
051017fulldraft.pdf (reporting inequities along these lines).
226. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
227. Brake, supranote 141, at 76.
228. Id. at 81.
229. Id. at 82.
230. See Susan L. Greendorfer, Title IX Gender Equity, Backlash andIdeology, WOMEN IN SPORT
& PHYSICAL ACTIvIIYJ., Spring 1998, at 69, 73, 80-90. In the context of Title IX, Greendorfer
explains that "[b] acklash emerges because resulting changes would be disruptive to the existing
patriarch [y] that is manifest in sporting practice." Id. at 83. Moreover, backlash itself reinforces
the dominant patriarchy of sports. Id. at 86 ("The very suggestion that the legal mandate is
unfair to men reasserts a construction of sport as male and intimates that male interests should
prevail.").
231.
Id. at 84.
232. This rhetoric is as old as Title IX itself. Male coaches and administrators publicly
objected to draft implementing regulations based on fears that they would "bankrupt" men's
athletic programs. See FESTLE, supra note 139, at 127-29. It is worth noting that this criticism
came at a time when only 30,000 women competed at an intercollegiate level, college athletic
departments allocated 2% of budgets to women's sports, and women's athletic scholarships
were unheard of. See generally WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND.: TITLE IX AT 30: ATHLETICS RECEIVE C+,
supra note 8. This Report Card underscores Greendorfer's conclusion that Title IX backlash,
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the

proportionality

prong

of OCR's compliance

test.2 34 Women

themselves have been maligned by male administrators, coaches, and players
in response to their efforts to secure equal treatment in athletics. 35
5.

The Effect of Opportunity on Interest and Participation

The cumulative effect of the antinormalizing factors discussed in this
section is to suppress women's interest and participation in sports. Scholars
have analyzed the ways in which gender-coding of particular opportunities
influences women's interest in pursuing them. For example, in her analysis
of sex segregation in the workplace, Professor Vicki Schultz presents
sociological research suggesting that women do not determine their interest
in ajob independent of the job market itself.23 6 When women in a particular

job do not receive the same rewards as men in the same position, or when
they see that job opportunities in that field are rare, they tend to develop, or

"premised on [a] doctrine of male superiority and privilege . . . ignores the fact that . .. the
sporting status quo [is] the cultural consequence of discrimination and ideological
socialization." Greendorfer, supranote 230, at 84.
233. In the 1990s, men's teams were cut more frequently than women's teams, see
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 19, but in recent years men's athletics overall has gained
opportunities, not lost. See Suggs, Gender Quotas, supranote 71 (reporting that the Department
of Education's most recent data shows men's college athletic opportunities increased "by about
2,700 between 2002-3 and 2003-4, and the number of men's teams either increased or remained
steady across all divisions").
To the extent that minor men's sports are getting squeezed, it is false to attribute this
to women's sports and Title IX rather than the big budget, big roster sports like men's football
and basketball that cause the disparities, and the budget crunches to begin with. Id.; see also
John R. Thelin, Good Sports?HistoricalPerspectiveon the PoliticalEconomy of IntercollegiateAthletics in
the Era of Title IX, 1972-1997,71 J. HIGHER EDUC. 391, 399-401 (2000) (describing in detail the
increasing expenditures associated with football-including money spent to buy out coaches'
salary contracts when they fail to win championships; aggressive recruitment and scholarship
distribution; putting players, coaches and staff up at hotels on the eve of home games; providing
year-round training tables and luxurious locker rooms; net expenses associated with going to a
Bowl Game; and noting in this context that "expanded athletic department expenses cannot be
explained wholly or even primarily by the increased expenses of women's athletic programs").
234. Nat'l Wrestling Coaches Ass'n v. Dep't of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2537 (2005) (dismissing for lack of standing wrestling coaches' claims that
Title IX discriminates against male athletes); Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1043,
1049 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an argument by male athletes that the proportionality prong
operated as a reverse-discrimination measure); COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 24-25.
235. For example, after the University of Texas agreed to double the number of female
athletes (increasing their percentage from 23% to 44% of all athletes) to settle Title IX
litigation brought by seven female athletes, Texas players and coaches faced public criticism,
harassment, and charges of lesbianism. FESTLE, supranote 139, at xxvi-xxviii.
236. See generally Shultz, supra note 141. Professor Brake compares Shultz's factors
influencing women's interest in jobs traditionally held by men to those that contribute to
women's interests and abilities in sports. Brake, supra note 141, at 73-74.
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at least report, other interests. 237 Efforts to preserve the hegemonic
masculinity of a particular job are also successful at suppressing women's
interests in those jobs. 238 Just as offering women opportunities inferior in
quantity and quality suppresses interest, making opportunities available for
women has the opposite effect.
For example, Professor Schultz notes that women who work in bluecollar trades and in jobs that are traditionally held by men often cite the
employer's affirmative action as the reason they pursued that particular line
of work. 39 In a similar vein, Professor Kimberly Yuracko explains that
"because of the salience of gender-group membership, girls respond
differently when they see a woman doing something than they do when they
see a man doing the same thing."24° Consequently, "female athlete role
models allow girls to develop an alternate vision in their own minds of who
and what they can become, and of what socially valued versions of
themselves might look like."241 More significantly, she argues, athletic
opportunities for women, distributed in proportion to women's numbers on
campus, help "change the social meaning attached
to femaleness" and the
2
cultural association of sport and masculinity.
In light of the different ways in which medical, social, educational and
legal structures have constructed women's relationship to athletics, the
effect of opportunity on women's interest in sports is clear. For example,
women are likely to respond to the lack of opportunities to play
intercollegiate football 43 by channeling their interests elsewhere, and they
develop an interest in playing football in much lower numbers than men.
When women perceive that they have lower chances of earning a scholarship
than men, and when differentials in the operating budget and coaches'
salaries imply the second-class treatment of their sports, women's interests
develop in directions where equal treatment is more likely. Alternatives to
sports may also be more appealing to women who are deterred by the stillextant hegemonic masculinity of sports, or the related risk of being
stigmatized as unfeminine, gay, or both, or the requisite self-sexualization to
preempt that stigma.
237. For example, in a study of secretaries, respondents "adjusted to their realistically
nonexistent possibility of advancement by rating the desirability of promotion relatively low."
Shultz, supra note 141, at 1829.
238. Shultz describes how sexual harassment is an effort to either weed women out or make
those who stay on the job "feel out of place," like "freaks" or "deviants," and "enables men to
continue to define their work (and themselves) in masculine terms." Id. at 1837.
239. Id. at 1829.
240. Yuracko, supra note 15, at 792. Yuracko uses the role-modeling argument and other
perfectionist rationales to defend Title IX's proportionality requirement. Id at 799-800.
241.
Id. at 793.
242. Id. at 795-96.
243. For a proposal to introduce women's intercollegiate football, see generally Rodney K.
Smith, Solving the Title IX Conundrum with Women's Football 38 S. TEx. L. REv. 1057 (1997).

SURVEYSAYS...
B.

TrIIh IX AND STRUCTURALISM

To the extent that Title IX has reduced the discrimination against
women in college and university athletics, it has been because the threeprong policy was written and interpreted in such a way that compliance
measured under the second and third prongs was difficult to attain and
sustain. This has nudged universities toward prong one, proportionality
compliance. A university cannot sustain compliance with prong two's
requirement of a history and continuingpractice of program expansion for
very long without further increasing participation opportunities for women,
ultimately arriving at the proportionality endpoint. Prong three, the focus of
this Part, is written to prevent university athletic departments from justifying
existing gender disparities on grounds that women are less interested in
sports than men. In fact, every federal appellate court that has considered
this "relative interest" approach has rejected it by insisting that if a university
were to hinge its compliance on prong three, it had to "fully" accommodate
women's interests and abilities,
consistent with the express language of the
• 244
1979 Policy Interpretation.
Further, courts that have considered the
nature of evidence a university may use to show compliance, or on which a
plaintiff may rely to prove 45noncompliance, have helped sustain prong
three's high compliance bar.2
As a mere exercise in giving meaning to every word in OCR's threeprong policy, the courts' interpretation of prong three does not necessarily
embody structuralism. Rather, it is in rationalizing why interest-defined
compliance should not be so easy that the courts recognize, at least in
general terms,
the powerful social forces that construct women's interests in
46
athletics.

2

This results in some doctrinal tension, however. Insisting that prong
three compliance remains difficult to attain actually validates prong three's
theoretical existence. Indeed, no court has suggested that prong three itself
is inconsistent with Title IX or the U.S. Constitution-only rejected the
watered-down versions of prong three put forth by university defendants or
stymied male athlete plaintiffs. Yet the structuralist rationale the courts

244. Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767-69 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v.
Brown Univ. (Cohen I1), 101 F.3d 155, 176 (1st Cir. 1996); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35
F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 1), 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir.
1993); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993).
245. Pederson v. La. State Univ. 213 F.3d 858, 878-79 (5th Cir. 2000); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at
179-80.
246.
See, e.g., Nea4 198 F.3d at 769 ("Title IX has altered women's preferences, making
them more interested in sports, and more likely to become student athletes .... Adopting [an]
interest-based test for Title IX compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady
increases in women's participation and interest in sports that have followed Title IX's
enactment."); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179 (noting that "[i]nterest and ability rarely develop in a
vacuum, [but] evolve as a function of opportunity and experience").
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employ in support of their rejection of a relaxed version of prong three
undermines any form of interest-defined compliance, no matter how
interest is measured or defined.
The 1993 decision in Cohen v. Brown University247 is, both by its own
description and any objective measure, the "watershed "2 48 decision about
equal athletic opportunity under Title IX. It was the first case to reject a
university's attempt to justify its disproportionate athletic offerings on the
grounds that women were less interested in athletics than men. In 1991,
Brown University announced the elimination of four intercollegiate athletic
teams as a cost-cutting measure: women's volleyball, women's gymnastics,
men's golf, and men's water polo. 249 Gymnasts and volleyball players-

representing a class of all present and potential Brown University female
student athletes-won an injunction ordering the reinstatement of their
teams. 250 On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 251 the
district court's decision that, under the preliminary injunction standard, the
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their claim that Brown's decision violated
Title IX. After a trial on the merits, the district court ruled that Brown's
intercollegiate athletics
program violated Title IX,252 and the First Circuit
2 3
affirmed that decision.

5

Even before the cut, Brown's percentage of female athletes was far from
proportionate to its percentage of female students. 254 Brown also had a weak
and spotty record of expanding women's athletics.25 5 The litigation therefore

focused on whether Brown fully and effectively accommodated women's
256
interests and abilities, in compliance with the third prong of OCR's policy.

Brown argued that it could satisfy the third prong by providing athletic
opportunities to women "in accordancewith the ratioof interested and able women
to interested and able men,, 25 7 and that if the policy did not allow for
compliance to be measured this way, then the policy violated both Title IX

247. Cohen , 991 F.2d at 888.
248. Id. at 891.
249. Id.at 892.
250. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 1001 (D.R.I. 1992).
251.
Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 907.
252. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 184, 214 (D.R.I. 1995).
253. Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen I), 101 F.3d 155, 180 (lst Cir. 1996).
254. During the preliminary injunction hearing, the statistical disparity was 10.9%, as
women made up 36.7% of Brown's athletes and 47.6% of its enrolled undergraduates. However,
even after Brown reinstated volleyball and gymnastics to satisfy the injunction, the statistical

disparity increased to 13.01%, because while the percentage of female athletes rose to 38.13%,
the percentage of women students rose to 51.14%. Id. at 163.

255.

Brown added a number of women's teams in the 1970s after it merged with all-

women's Pembroke College, but the only team added "after this period was winter track, in

1982." Id.
256.

Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 903-04.

257.

Id. at 899.

SURVEY SAYS...
and the U.S. Constitution.25 The First Circuit rejected Brown's arguments in
both its first and second opinions on the case. 259
The First Circuit rejected Brown's proposal to measure prong-three
compliance in terms of relative interest as inconsistent with the policy's
requirement that women's athletic interest and abilities be "fully and
effectively accommodated" for an institution to comply under the third
prong. The court held that this "myopic" view "reads the 'full' out of the
duty to accommodate 'fully and effectively"' women's interests and abilities
in athletics. 2 ° In the face of Brown's disparate distribution of athletic
opportunities between men and women and its lack of progress in
expanding opportunities for women, the seemingly gender-neutral decision
2 61
to eliminate two women's teams and two men's teams violated Title IX.
The court acknowledged that relying on prong three to measure compliance
with Title IX may require a university "to give the underrepresented gender
(in this case, women) what amounts to a larger slice of a shrinking athletic
,,262
opportunity pie.
The First Circuit also insisted that its reading of the policy conformed to
Title IX's "unmistakably clear mandate that educational institutions not use
federal monies to perpetuate gender-discrimination. 2 6 ' Because "interest
a vacuum, [but they] evolve as a function of
and ability rarely develop in,,.264
interest-defined compliance would "limit[]
opportunity and experience,
...program expansion for the underrepresented sex to the status quo level
of relative interests" and would "entrench and fix by law the significant
gender-based disparity in athletic opportunities [that] exist[s] at Brown."2 6 '
Further explaining its rejection of interested-defined compliance, the court
noted:
To assert that Tide IX permits institutions to provide fewer
athletics participation opportunities for women than for men,
based upon the premise that women are less interested in sports

258.

Id. at 899-900.

259.

Id.; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ, (Cohen I1), 101 F.3d 155, 175-76 (1st Cir. 1996).

260.
261.

Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 899.
Put more colorfully, "even balanced use of the budget-paring knife runs afoul of Title

IX where, as here, the fruits of a university's athletic program remain ill-distributed after the

trimming takes place." Id.
at 906.
262.
Id.; see also Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 176 (quoting Cohen Ifor same). The First Circuit Court
of Appeals also acknowledged deference to the policy as a "plausible, if not inevitable, reading
of Title IX," affirming that the three-prong test as a whole is reasonably constructed to meet the
statute's goal of determining whether a student has been excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of an athletic program. Cohen , 991 F.2d at 899; see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at
173 (citing Cohen Ifor same).
263.

Cohen1,991 F.2d at 907; see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 176 (citing Cohen lfor same).

264. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179.
265. Id. at 174 (quoting the district court opinion, Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 184,
209 (D.R.I.1995)); id.at 176, 180.
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than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that Title
IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from
stereotyped notions of women's interests and abilities. 266
Brown also challenged the constitutionality of Title IX, arguing that if
Title IX authorized a regulatory policy that required full accommodation of
women's interests and abilities but not men's interests and abilities, then the
26
statute would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 1
The First Circuit held that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
Congress and OCR reasonably based the legislation and regulations on a
view that "women, given the opportunity, will naturally participate in
athletics in numbers equal to men."26 Specifically, the court said, "[w]hile it
might well be that more men than women at Brown are currently interested
in sports, Brown points to no evidence in the record that men are any more
likely to engage in athletics than women, absent socialization and disparate
269
opportunities.

The First Circuit's adamant rejection of the relative interest theory did
not stop parties to Title IX litigation in other jurisdictions from advancing
the same argument. Colorado State University ("CSU") defended its
decision to cut women's softball27 0 by arguing that it cut men's baseball at
the same time.271 CSU maintained that women's unmet interest and ability
(measured by the number of disappointed softball players) was relative to
men's (measured by the number of disappointed baseball players) and,
therefore, permissible under the third prong.2 72 However, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, citing Cohen I, determined that the third prong measures
absolute interest, not relative unmet interest, when it came to women's
athletics. 273 Therefore, the fact that CSU terminated an established, healthy
women's team easily satisfied the court that the university
was not
74
accommodating women's interests and abilities in athletics.2

266.
267.

Id. at 178-79.
The Fifth Amendment's equal protection provision was at issue because Title IX was

enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, rather than its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
5.
268.

Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900.

269.

Id.

270. Like the Cohen plaintiffs, Jennifer Roberts and her co-plaintiffs easily established that
CSU failed to satisfy prongs one and two because the proportion of athletic opportunities for

women and enrolled female undergraduates differed by 10.5%, and CSU had a history and
continuing practice of contracting, rather than expanding, opportunities for women. Roberts v.
Colo.State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993).

271.
272.

Id. at 831.
Id.

273.
274.

Id. (citing Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898).
Id. at 832 n.1l (citing Cohen 1,991 F.2d at 904).

SURVEYSAYS...
The next year, relying on the First and Tenth Circuit decisions, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals impliedly rejected a relative interest
approach to prong-three compliance when it held that the University of
Illinois's decision to eliminate its men's swimming team-but not its
women's swimming team-was a "reasonable response to the requirements
of the applicable regulation and policy interpretation.,2 7 5 The Seventh
Circuit thus recognized prong three as an absolute, not relative, prohibition
against unmet interest among women athletes when it noted that, had
Illinois terminated women's swimming, it would have failed prong three, as
"women with a demonstrated interest in an intercollegiate athletic activity
and demonstrated ability to compete at [that]
level would be left without an
276
opportunity to participate in their sport."
When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the relative
interest theory, it did so at the plaintiffs' behest. Wrestlers at Cal StateBakersfield claimed that the University's decision to cap its men's wrestling
team, pursuant to a consent decree, violated Title IX.2 77 The wrestlers
argued that "gender-conscious remedies are appropriate only when
necessary to ensure that schools provide opportunities to males and females
.
,,278
in proportion to their relative levels of interest in sports participation.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit insisted that the plaintiffs' proposed
qualification of interest would be inconsistent with Title IX, since "requiring
only that each gender's expressed interest in participating be
accommodated equally would freeze the inequality of the status quo."279 The
court continued:
Title IX [envisions] equal opportunity for all athletes and
recognizes that, where society has conditioned women to expect
less than their fair share of the athletic opportunities, women's
interest in participating in sports will not rise to a par with men's
overnight .... Title IX has altered women's preferences, making

them more interested in sports, and more likely to become student
athletes .

.

.

. Adopting

[an] interest-based test for Title IX

compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady

275. Kelley v. Bd.of Trs., Univ. of Ill.,
35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994). The University of
Illinois failed proportionality compliance by more than twenty percentage points and did not
have a history and continuing practice of expanding athletic opportunities for women. See id. at
269.
276. Id. at 270.
277. Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1999).
278. Id. at 767.
279. Id. at 769-70 (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen II), 101 F.3d 155, 178-79 (1st Cir.
1999)).
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increases in women's . . . sports that have followed Title IX's
28 0
enactment.

In addition to rejecting a relative approach to measuring
accommodation of women's interests and abilities under prong three, courts
have also considered what types of evidence can properly establish
compliance or noncompliance with that test. 28 1 Again, their reasoning on

this part reflected the view that when it comes to using interest levels to
define compliance, Title IX requires that a high bar must be set.
In its second decision in Cohen v. Brown University,'82 the First Circuit
rejected the argument that statistical evidence alone could suffice as a
measure of compliance with prong three. The court wrote that "there exists
the danger that, rather than providing a true measure of women's interest in
sports, statistical evidence purporting to reflect women's interest instead
provides only a measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the
283
basis for women's lack of opportunity to participate in sports."
Acknowledging that Title IX and its regulations permit statistics derived
from an interest survey to measure interests and abilities for the purposes of
determining whether an institution complies with prong three, it rejected
the argument that this statistical evidence "standing alone" can justify
,284
11
"providing fewer
opportunities for women than for men.
Significantly,
the First Circuit rejected the very method for measuring interest-statistical
285
evidence "standing alone"-that OCR would later sanction in 2005.

280. Id.
281.
Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179-80; Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878-79 (5th
Cir. 2000).
282. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 155.
283. Id. at 179.
284. Id. at 179-80. This section is arguably dictum; the court was clear that even if such
evidence was reliable, it was "irrelevant where, as here, viable and successful women's varsity
teams have been demoted or eliminated." Id,at 180.
285. While the First Circuit's express rejection of Brown's attempt to rely on statistical
evidence alone, see id. at 179-80, does not bode well for the 2005 Clarification, it does not
necessarily mean that the 2005 Clarification is doomed to a similar fate. Unlike a university,
OCR is entitled to deference for any regulatory construction that is not "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
However, courts will extend somewhat less deference to an agency's policy
interpretation of its own regulations. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)
(suggesting that opinion letters and other policies are entitled to respect but not deference).
Even after Christensen,federal appellate courts have continued to apply Chevrondeference to the
three-prong policy, because OCR promulgated the policy using formal rulemaking procedures.
See Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (8th Cir. 2002) (deferring to OCR's threeprong policy because it interpreted an ambiguous regulation). But because the 2005
Clarification is a policy interpretation rather than a formally promulgated regulation, courts are
likely to apply Christensenrespect rather than Chevrondeference to determine whether the 2005
Clarification is a permissible construction of Title IX.

SURVEY SAYS...
While the First Circuit adopted a restrictive view of the type of evidence
a university might put forth to prove compliance with prong three, the Fifth
Circuit adopted a permissive view of what a plaintiff must demonstrate to
show that a university is not complying. 28 6 Female Louisiana State University
("LSU") students and erstwhile athletes sued LSU challenging, among other
things, its failure to field
a women's fast-pitch softball team (at any level) as a
28 7
violation of Title IX.
The district court found the requisite level of women's interest and
ability based on a variety of evidence. First, LSU had a women's fast-pitch
softball team from 1979 until 1983, when it was disbanded by the
university. 2ss Second, since that time, national, regional, and local interest in
women's fast-pitch softball had increased at both the high school and
intercollegiate level.2 9 Third, the plaintiffs testified that they were interested
in and capable of competing on an intercollegiate softball team at any level
290
of competition . g When LSU complained to the Fifth Circuit that this
evidence did not sustain the plaintiffs' burden of proving noncompliance
with prong three ,9 the court called LSU "brazen[], 92 The court saw LSU's
defense as an argument that an "institution with no coach, no facilities, no
varsity team, no scholarships, and no recruiting in a given sport must have
on campus enough national-caliber athletes to field a competitive varsity
team in that sport before a court can find sufficient interest and abilities to
exist."293 The court refused to adopt such criteria, which would
"eliminate an
" 94
2
time.
any
at
plaintiff
any
by
claim
accommodation
effective
The above discussion shows how courts have consistently rejected efforts
to water down prong-three compliance and have required schools that have
not attained proportionality compliance to fully accommodate women's
interests in athletics--even if it means granting immunity from lawsuits
challenging budget-driven decisions to terminate men's teams. There are,
effectively, two strains of reasoning that the courts espouse in support of this
conclusion. First, the courts recognize that anything less than full
accommodation of women's interests (absent proportionally distributed

286. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878-79 (5th Cir. 2000).
287. Id. at 864.
288. Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 915 (M.D. La. 1996), rev'd, 201 F.3d 388
(5th Cir. 2000), superseded and vacated by panelon reh'g,213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
289. Id.
290. Id.

291.

With a twenty-point disparity between the percentage of athletic opportunities for

women (29%) and the percentage of women enrolled as undergraduates (49%), LSU flunked

the substantial proportionality prong by as many percentage points as Brown and CSU
combined. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 878. Nor did LSU have a history and continuous practice of

expanding women's athletics programs. Id. at 879.
292.

Id. at 878.

293.

Id.

294.

ld.
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athletic opportunities) relies on-and validates-the stereotype that women
are less interested in athletics than men, an assumption that is inconsistent
with Title IX.295 Had the courts stopped here, their reasoning would reflect
basic formal equality by insisting on similar treatment for similarly situated
(interested) women and men-free of the stereotypes about women's
interest.296 As Professor Vicki Shultz explains, such a theory is problematic
because it is only concerned with individual women who happen to develop
an interest in nontraditional work or sports notwithstanding the social
structures operating to suppress that interest. 297 This absolves the regulated
institution (an employer, an educational institution) from having to provide
298
opportunity in order to generate interest among women.
However, the courts did more than just insist that it was impermissible
to rely on stereotyped notions about women's interests in sports. Instead,
they recognized that any attempt to measure that interest would reflect the
2 99
effects of "socialization and disparate opportunities."
Additionally, the
•-300
courts recognized that just as lack of opportunities • suppresses
interest,
•
01
providing opportunities to women generates their interest in sports.

295.

The Cohen II courtstated:
To assert that Title IX permits institutions to provide fewer athletic participation
opportunities for women than men, based upon the premise that women are less
interested in sports than are men, is (among other things) to ignore the fact that
Title IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination that results from
stereotyped notions of women's interests and abilities.

Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal.
State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Cohen II for same).
296. This reasoning does not necessarily proscribe institutions from using something other
than stereotypes to justify a conclusion that women are less interested in athletics than men.
Courts allowed favorable treatment to women's teams relative to men's-i.e., giving them a
"larger piece" of the shrinking pie. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 906 (1st Cir. 1993);
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 272 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Allowing a school to
consider gender when determining which athletic programs to terminate ensures that in
instances where overall athletic opportunities decrease, the actual opportunities to the
underrepresented gender do not."). Such an outcome could be justified solely by the
defendant's failure to make a case that something other than stereotypes were at play, and
distinguished from future cases in which something other than stereotypes might be proffered
in support of relative interest.
297. Shultz, supra note 141, at 1807-08.
298. Id.
299.
Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 900; see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 179 (suggesting that statistical
evidence of women's interest in sports is likely to reflect women's lack of opportunity).
300. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 878 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that
evidence of interest in softball among LSU women was likely to be sparse, as there was "no
coach, no facilities, no varsity team, no scholarships, and no recruiting"); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at
179 (noting that "interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; they evolve as a function of
opportunity and experience").
301.
Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 769 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Tide IX has
altered women's preferences, making them more interested in sports.").

SURVEYSAYS...
This

second,

structuralist-influenced

view30 2

bolsters

the

courts'

conclusion that relative interest theories and evidence standards that favor
universities should not water down prong-three compliance. The Ninth
Circuit even expressly suggested that an "interest-based test for Tide IX
compliance would hinder, and quite possibly reverse, the steady increases in
30 3
women's participation in sports that have followed Tide IX's enactment."
Inconsistently, however, the courts have left prong three intact, inviting
future courts, OCR, and the regulated community to infer that interest,
properly measured and defined, can justify something less than
proportionality compliance.

C. 2005 CLARIFICA TONABANDONS THESTRUCTURALISTEQUALITY OF TITLE IX
If female students are satisfied with the fact that their university offers relatively
fewer athletic opportunities to women than to men, how can the university be
discriminatingagainstwomen?
The 2005 Clarification reduces Title IX's application to college athletics
to this answer-begging question, which itself reveals the policy's conceptual
flaw. Even under the best possible survey conditions-widespread, careful
participation by all relevant respondents34-the very concept of using survey
responses to set participation rates for women is inconsistent with Tide IX's
anti-discrimination mandate.
Discrimination persists, as the courts have held, when universities
accept and perpetuate stereotypes about women's interests in athletics. By
introducing the Model Survey, the 2005 Clarification gives universities an
alternative to relying on stereotypes. In this way, the 2005 Clarification
attempts 3° 5 to espouse a basic formal equality-treating sports-drawn women
similarly to sports-drawn men. However, the 2005 Clarification is
incompatible with the courts' additional, structuralist reasoning. The courts
understood that gender stereotypes contributed to a deficit in both the
number and nature of existing athletic opportunities for women, and that
no measure of interest, particularly a survey, can control for the effect of this
0 6
deficit on women's reported interest.

302. The Ninth Circuit cited Note, supra note 141, at 1640-41, and Bredthauer, supra note
211, at 1107, to support the causal connection between opportunity and interest. Neal, 198 F.3d
at 769.
303. Neal, 198 F.3d at 769.
304. For arguments why this is unlikely, see supraPart II.
305. I explain in infra Part III.D why even if the survey method proposed in the 2005
Clarification could identify similarly situated individuals, it still fails to provide similar

treatment.
306. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 180 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Empirical] evidence,
standing alone, cannot justify providing fewer athletics opportunities for women than for
men.").
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Women's responses to the questions "are you interested" and "are you
capable"-the key questions in the Model Survey-will inevitably reflect the
medical, social, educational, and legal structures that have socially
constructed women's perceived limited interest in sports. 3 7 Using these
results to determine a university's compliance obligation perpetuates these
interest-suppressing structures and therefore contravenes the anti
discrimination mandate of Title IX.
The 2005 Clarification also upends the three-prong policy by allowing
schools to rely comfortably on prong three as an end-point for compliance.
In the past, schools that satisfied prong three notwithstanding lopsided
athletic offerings still had motivation to strive for proportionality under
prong one. Prong three's former approach incorporated a variety of factors,
including regional trends, as well as qualitative and quantitative measures of
student interest. 308 The increase in a particular sport's popularity within the
community or a rise in the number of students or applicants who expressed
an interest in that sport (factors difficult for a university to control and
predict) could expose the school to an enforcement action by OCRjudicial
action. In contrast, prong-one proportionality compliance-though more
difficult to achieve for schools with low percentages of female athletes, high
percentages of female students, or both-offers a truly safe haven. Once a
school brings women's relative representation in the athletics program close
to its relative female representation on campus, it can reasonably expect to
successfully defend its program's offerings against regulatory or judicial
scrutiny. Moreover, unlike the pre-2005 factors contributing to a prongthree determination, the factors contributing to proportionality compliance
are within the university's control (as with the number of participation
opportunities offered to women and men) and easier to predict (as with the
gender breakdown of the student body" 9).
The 2005 Clarification makes prong three into an equally attainable
safe haven. So long as the results of the survey do not reveal an entire team's
worth of women interested and capable of competing in a particular sport,
the university is assured that those statistics will insulate it from Title IX
liability. The factors courts consider in prong-three compliance, once
indeterminate and beyond the university's control, are now just as
predictable and manageable as the factors contributing to proportionality.
Relying on the questionable causal connection between opportunity and

307. See supraPart II.A.
308. OCR's complete list of factors contributing to a determination of unmet interest is set
forth in supranote 57 and accompanying text.
309. For example, the National Center for Education Statistics predicts that women's
enrollment will increase 22% between 2000 and 2013 and that men's enrollment will increase
15% in that same time period. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS TO 2013 (Oct. 2003), availableat http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections.
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interest,1 ° a university can anticipate that the Model Survey results will show
relatively low interest among women in sports that the university does not
offer. Further, by failing to increase offerings in women's sports, a university
can deter women interested in that sport from applying for admission and
enrolling.
This second criticism reflects deficiencies in prong three and the 2005
Clarification. By various courts' own reasoning proffered against watereddown versions of prong three," they should have condemned prong three
entirely rather than simply nullifying its effects by making it harder and less
desirable to attain. It is no wonder colleges and universities complain that
they are confused by what Title IX requires.112 On one hand, OCR continues
to insist that the three-prong test is flexible," 3 that each prong is an "equally
sufficient means of complying with Title IX, " "' and that "no one prong is
favored." 31 5 On the other hand, OCR, bolstered by the courts, has made
compliance under prongs two and three difficult to attain and to sustain.
D.

2005 CLARwFICATIONDOES NOT REQUIRE SIMILAR TREATMENT
FORMEN'S AND WOMEN'S SPORTS

Not only is the newly clarified prong three incapable of accurately
defining a class of "sports-interested women" for the purpose of comparing
their treatment to that of sports-interested men, it fails to provide that class
of women equal treatment to similarly situated male counterparts.
Pursuant to the 2005 Clarification, universities may now set
participation levels for women-or more accurately, justify existing
disparities in participation-based on the responses of its enrolled female
students. That universities recruit many, or in some cases most, of their
athletes-male and female alike-shows the senselessness of making
program expansion for women contingent on survey responses from a selfselected pool of nonrecruits. 31 6 By expecting sports-interested women to
express interest and ability in nonexistent opportunities, the 2005
Clarification treats them differently than sports-interested men.
At schools where the 2005 Clarification and prong-three compliance is
relevant, male students participate in sports at a higher rate than women,
because those schools cannot satisfy prong-one proportionality. In setting
men's participation levels, a university does not require men to show up to
nonexisting opportunities before they are deemed "interested." It decides

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See supraPart H.B.
Supra Part III.B.

315.

Id.

316.

See supraPart II.B.2 (arguing that the target population is illogical).

COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 6, at 25-26.

1996 CLARIFICATION, supranote 15; 2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20.
2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20.
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whether to continue to field a men's team based on the men who have
shown up to play, including many who were recruited by the university's own
affirmative efforts.3 17 In contrast, pursuant to the 2005 Clarification, the
university can make its decision about whether there is sufficient interest to
field a women's team without considering the effect that more opportunities
and affirmative recruiting would have on getting interested women to enroll.
The policy does not ensure neutral treatment of male and female athletes,
because men get the benefit of a presumption of higher interest. Women
have to prove theirs. 318
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

As the last Part explained, interest-defined compliance has always
conceptually defied Title IX. For the last twelve years, however, courts have
minimized this problem by enforcing a construction of prong three that
made it a difficult and uncertain measure of compliance.3 1 9 This, in turn,
made prong one a more attractive alternative. The criticism aimed at the
2005 Clarification, which changed prong three by making it easier to achieve
and more reliable as a bulwark to litigation, exposes the latent tension
lurking in the three-prong policy itself: on one hand, a structuralist-inspired
progress-seeking push toward prong one proportionality compliance, and
on the other, the potential for structuralism-defying, status-quo-sustaining,
interest-defined compliance. As a result of this tension, any proposal for
reform must go beyond repealing the 2005 Clarification and address the
problems inherent in the three-prong policy that cause universities and
other Title IX skeptics to agitate for reform.
This Part first explores the sources of confusion underlying OCR's
three-prong policy. Then, it suggests two alternative means for reform in
addition to merely repealing the 2005 Clarification that would alleviate the
latent tension without violating structuralist-equality principles. One way is

317. As a percentage of the overall student athlete population, female athletes are actually
more likely to have been recruited than male athletes, because football teams offer many
opportunities for walk-ons. DONNA LOPIANO, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., EQUITY IN WOMEN'S
SPORTS-A HEALTH AND FAIRNESS PERSPECTIVE, http://womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi
bin/iowa/issues/rights/article.html?record=121 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). However, even the
average Division I football team, with thirty-two walk-on players, has eighty-five recruited
scholarship players. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUND., FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY,
NOT WEAKENING

CIVIL

RIGHTS

LAW, Is

KEY TO

TITLE

IX

COMPLIANCE AND

DETERRING

(Dec. 2002),
http://womenssportsfoundation.org. Assuming those eighty-five men account for some of the
proportionality differential, these recruited players are getting preferential treatment (the
presumption of their interest) as compared to the women who could have been recruited for a
complementary women's program in football or some other sport.
318. See Jocelyn Samuels & Kristen Galles, In Defense of Title IX: Why Current Policies Are
Requiredto EnsureEquality of Opportunity, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 11, 39 (2003).
319. See supraPart III.B.
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to re-clarify the three-prong policy in a way that endorses proportionality
under prong one as the only favored means of long-term compliance with
Title IX. Or OCR could adopt an alternative fourth prong that would be a
suitable endpoint for compliance, such as proportionality of aggregate
expenditures on women's and men's athletics programs.
A.

SOURCES OF CONFUSION:MIXED MESSAGES AND INTELLECTUAL INCONSISTENCY

OCR has repeatedly emphasized the flexibility inherent in three
equally favored prongs with which colleges and universities can choose to
demonstrate Title IX compliance. At the same time, before the 2005
Clarification, OCR and the courts rejected universities' efforts to water
prong-three compliance down to a test of relative interest demonstrable by
survey evidence alone. As discussed above, the courts have essentially
decided that for interest-defined compliance to be permissible, it must
effectively be unattainable, at least as a compliance endpoint.
OCR's 2005 Clarification reconciles this tension but, as argued above, in
a manner that is inconsistent with Title IX. If the First Circuit's distrust of
"statistical evidence, without more0 20 is any indication, courts may be willing
to forgo the deference they have repeatedly extended to OCR's
implementing regulations under Title IX.12 1 Alternatively, OCR could cave
under political pressure over time and repeal the 2005 Clarification itself.
Even if OCR rescinds the 2005 Clarification, without additional
modification of the three-prong compliance policy, the agency will continue
to send mixed messages about the nature of the three-prong test. College
and university athletic departments will go right back to wondering why
prong three, if it is as equally favored as OCR keeps insisting, remains a
more difficult and less reliable measure of compliance than prong one?
They will continue to report "confusion" over the three-prong policy, 3 22 and
OCR will continue to issue "clarifications" that do not contain any real
clarity.323 This will continue to distract both sides from the necessary task of
devising equitable, fiscally responsible, and politically acceptable solutions
for Title IX compliance.
B.

RE-CLARFICATION

The solution could be as simple as an express admission from OCR that
prong three is not equally favored. Instead, OCR could declare prong three,

320. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179 (1st Cir. 1996).
321.
See supra note 285 (explaining that federal appellate courts have applied traditional
Cheuron deference to OCR's three-prong policy, but will likely examine the 2005 Clarification
with greater scrutiny because it did not result from a formal rulemaking process).
322.

COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 25-26.

323.
2003 CLARIFICATION, supra note 20 (reiterating the flexibility of the three-prong test
and reminding regulated universities that no one prong is favored).
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like prong two, to be an interim compliance measure that affords
universities immunity until they ultimately reach proportionality
compliance. Such a clarification would be consistent with the courts' view
that prong three cannot be satisfied when interested and able female
athletes are denied the opportunity to play.324 It would also explain why
universities must rely on a variety of qualitative and fluid factors to measure
interest. OCR should make clear that prong three is unappealing on purpose
it does not want universities to rely on it forever. This approach would
basically collapse the three-prong policy into a proportionality test with two
alternatives for interim compliance.
A new policy mandating (or clarifying) that prong-one proportionality
is the mandatory compliance endpoint could be challenged as beyond the
scope of Title IX or Congress's authority to remedy past discrimination. The
courts that have upheld the three-prong policy have avoided arguments that
mandatory proportionality contravenes the statute or the Constitution by
pointing out that proportionality is one of three choices for compliance.
However, while the legality of a mandatory proportionality policy is
uncertain, it is defensible. Congress may exercise otherwise-constitutional
authority to provide a remedy for past discrimination without running afoul
of the equal protection principles in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 3 6 as long as Congress has authorized a remedial measure that
is substantially related to an- important government interest. 32v The courts
that have considered the constitutionality of Title IX as construed by the
three-prong test have recognized that ending the legacy of gender
discrimination in extracurricular activities, such as athletics, is an important

324. See supraPart III.
325. Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 171 (concluding that the proportionality prong is constitutional
in part because "it is but one aspect of the inquiry into whether an institution's athletics
program complies with Title IX"); Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Ill., 35 F.3d 265, 271 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1994) ("We express no opinion as to whether, if the policy interpretation did in fact
mandate substantial proportionality, it would be unconstitutional or in contravention of the
statute.").
326. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 901 (1st Cir. 1993).
Congress enacted Title IX under its authority deriving from the Spending Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl.1. See generallyJackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 554 U.S. 167 (2005). As a
federal statute, Title IX must comply with the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which
protects citizens from equal protection violations by the federal government to the same extent
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects citizens from equal protection violations by states. See
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1995).
327. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996); Ke//y, 35 F.3d at 272 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to Title IX); see also Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 183-84. Cohen II did not
reconsider the Cohen I court's decision upholding the constitutionality of Title IX as construed
by the three-prong policy. It considered whether the district court's remedial order was itself a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and acknowledged that
the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment was coextensive with the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth. Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 182 n.20.
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government objective.32 8 They have also found Title IX and the three-prong
compliance policy substantially related to that objective.329
Mandatory proportionality is equally related to the important
government objective of ending the legacy of gender discrimination in
college athletics. In fact, it is a more appropriate means of satisfying that
objective than the three-prong test. The three-prong test allows universities
to offer disproportionate opportunity so long as they fully accommodate
what they believe to be women's interests and abilities. However, as this
Article has explored, interest in athletics is disproportionately lower among
female students because of the socially constructed antinormalization of
women's participation. This, in turn, is rooted in "'fixed notions concerning
the roles and abilities of males and females' 3 3 0 or "overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of
males and females." 3 1 Until women and girls have been allowed to
participate in athletics on equal terms as men and boys, Congress can
reasonably infer that women's disproportionately low interest in athletics
results, ultimately, from "fixed notions" and "overbroad generalizations"
about gender. Therefore, it can constitutionally assent to a regulatory policy
that seeks to equalize the distribution of those opportunities.3 32
C. PROPORTIONATEEXPENDITURES: A FOURTHPRONG OF COMPLIANCE?

Instead of affirming proportionality as the single favored prong, OCR
could offer university athletic departments true flexibility by offering them
another manner of compliance that would be suitable as an endpoint for

328. Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272; see also Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763,
767-69 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 184 (finding an important government objective of
"'avoid[ing] the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices'") (internal
citation omitted).
329. Neal, 198 F.3d at 772; Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 184; Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272 (protecting the
interest of the disproportionately burdened gender satisfies equal protection). These courts
were focused not so much on the question of the constitutional proportionality requirement,
but the interpretation of the third prong of compliance that protected women's teams at
institutions where proportionality was not met.
330.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725
(1982)).
331. Id. at 533, 541; see also supraPart III.A.
332. Even if proportionality was overbroad as a remedy, owing to doubts that men's and
women's relative interest in athletics was anything but the same, it would still be an appropriate
means to enforce the antidiscrimination mandate. Unlike other contexts subject to remedial
antidiscrimination measures, such as employment and educational opportunities generally,
Congress has endorsed separate men's and women's sports. In order to set up a scheme in
which, contrary to our instincts, separate actually means equal, it is appropriate to construe
Title IX as insisting on equitable allocation of resources. Cf Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (noting, in
dicta, that "once it is agreed Title IX does not require that all teams be co-ed ... schools must
be provided some means of establishing that despite offering single-sex teams, they have
provided 'equal athletic opportunit[ies] ... for both sexes'").
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compliance. Under this approach, prong two and prong three (the pre-2005
version) would both be available for universities to use as interim
compliance measures, or stopover points on the way to prong one or four.
To be consistent with Title IX, the regulatory policy as interpreted by
the courts, and the structuralist-equality principles attendant to Title IX, this
hypothetical "fourth prong" would measure whether universities have
"accommodated the interests and abilities of both sexes"-the prong-three
regulatory standard that Congress has endorsed-by taking into account the
role that universities themselves have played, and continue to play, in
constructing women's interests in athletics. It would insist that universities
ultimately comply with Title IX in a manner that does not suppress women's
interest in athletics by sanctioning a distribution of resources that appears to
favor men.
Under this hypothetical prong four, courts would not judge an
institution's athletic offerings to be discriminatory under Title IX when, if
they are not proportional in number, they are at least proportional in
nature. If a university can demonstrate that its aggregate expenditures to
men's and women's athletic programs are substantially proportionate to
their respective enrollments, it would also comply with Title IX's mandate of
nondiscrimination in athletic participation. Equal distribution of financial
resources is an appropriate measure of nondiscrimination under Title IX
because it puts the burden on the university to signal equal respect for
women's and men's sports (crucial as one considers that lack of athletic
opportunities at a college level have suppressed women's interest in sports)
rather than put the burden on women to self-generate interest in order to
warrant the opportunity to play.
Currently, Title IX's regulations allow OCR to consider whether
universities equitably support their men's and women's programs, but they
do not require that universities provide funding in a manner proportionate
to enrollment. 333 In fact, the implementing regulations expressly state that
compliance does not require equitable aggregate funding, which has
resulted in large disparities in the scholarships and operating budgets for
men's and women's sports. 34 Prong four would not require equitable
funding-it would be an option, an alternative to providing proportional
opportunities under prong one.33 5 Therefore, OCR would not need to

333. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (c) (2005). As noted in Part I.A, supra,the implementing regulations
rely on other factors, primarily participation opportunity, to determine whether separate
athletic programs for men and women are in some sense equal.
334. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (reporting that Division I schools spend
nearly twice as much on men's sports than on women's sports).
335. Of course, just as OCR has done under prong one, it should not mandate strict
proportionality of spending under prong four. A range of substantial proportionality should be
allowed to account for reasonable differences in the costs of different sports.
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overhaul its regulations and modify the compliance policy to include prong
four.
To be consistent with the structuralist-equality principles, prong four
must measure and compare gross rather than net expenditures. Especially at
Division I colleges, football and men's basketball programs generate
revenue, and some threatened programs, like wrestling, have attracted the
attention of potential donors.336 If prong four measured and compared only
the expenditures not offset by revenue, many schools that do not comply
with prong one now would automatically comply with prong four without
having to change their spending or athletic offerings in any way.31
However, how much a private donor might decide to kick in to support
his or her favorite sport, or how much the public is willing to pay for tickets
to an Iowa/Michigan football game,3 8 have no place in the compliance
formula. The relatively higher revenue-generating potential of certain men's
sports derives from the very social forces that suppress women's interest and
participation. Thus, prong four is only an appropriate compliance endpoint
under Title IX if it asks whether a university is fairly treating its male and
female students through aggregate gross expenditures, separate from
external, socially constructed market demands that enable men's sports to
generate comparatively more revenue.
To be sure, universities face a higher burden under prong four when
revenue is left out of the equation. Different sports have different costs
associated with them. Market demands may force a university to spend more
to hire a coach for its men's basketball team than its women's basketball
team. Some of its revenue-generating men's teams may have to travel more
frequently than women's teams in order to participate in the most
competitive conferences. It simply may cost more to play football than crew,
baseball than softball, men's basketball than women's basketball. In light of
the different costs associated with different sports, universities that do not
wish to curb spending on men's sports (especially those like football and
basketball with the potential to generate revenue) may find it difficult to
impossible to come close to proportional spending for its women's

336.

Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting that an offer

from a private donor to fund a wrestling team exempted the university from proportionality
compliance, noting that donor-funded discrimination would be attributable to the university:
"Once a university receives a monetary donation, the funds become public money, subject to

Tide IX's legal obligations in their disbursement.").
337. For example, some universities where football is profitable would easily satisfy a
compliance test that compared net expenditures rather than gross expenditures. I confirmed
this by reviewing data reported to the Department of Education under the Equity in Athletics
Disclosure Act of 1994, which is compiled and reported by the Chronicle of Higher Education,
http://chronicle.com/stats/genderequity/2004/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
338. The cost of a ticket to the 2005 game was sixty dollars. See Hawkeye Sports,
http://www.hawkeyesports.collegesports.com/tickets/iowa-tickets.html
(last visited Feb. 22,
2006).
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programs. But this real concern is addressed by the flexibility principle
espoused by OCR and preserved with this proposal for reform. A university
unwilling or unable to ensure equity in expenditures does not have to do so.
It can ensure equity in participation opportunities, that is, comply with
prong one, instead.
The remainder of this subpart discusses six reasons why proportionality
in gross expenditures on women's and men's sports would be an
appropriate method of compliance with Title IX.
1. A Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Respects the Structuralist Model
of Equality Reflected in Title IX
Equitable funding is an appropriate measure of nondiscrimination
because it, like proportionality, does not rely on women's constructed
relative interest to justify favored treatment for men's sports. A university
that complies with this proposed prong four is not complicit in the social
structures that antinormalize women's participation in sports because
proportionate funding sends a signal, measured in dollars instead of
numbers, to female students that it equally values their collective
participation.
2.

A Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Would Help Control
Excessive Spending

Many blame rampant excessive spending in high-profile men's sports,
like football, for the financial constraints that cause universities to struggle
with Title IX compliance.
Commentators have described football
expenditures as an "arms race"-whatever spending one program does to
gain a competitive edge on the field or to curry favor with recruits, other
programs must match if they want to stay in the game.340 Luxury locker
rooms, indoor practice facilities, lavish recruiting events, and buying out the
contracts of coaches who fail to win championships are all examples of
excessive spending that have driven up the cost of running competitive
intercollegiate football programs.3 4' Some have argued that big-budget items

339. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 Hous. L. REv. 993, 1055-57
(1995); Rich Haglund, StaringDown the Elephant: College Footballand Title IX Compliance, 34J.L. &
EDUC. 439, 448-51 (2005) (exposing the "well-traveled myth that football funds other athletic
opportunities for male and female athletes" and suggesting that reducing the number of
football scholarships and otherwise trimming football-associated expenditures are viable
alternatives to eliminating nonrevenue men's teams); Daniel R. Marburger & Nancy HogsheadMakar, Is Title IX Really to Blamefor the Decline in IntercollegiateMen's Nonrevenue Sports?, 14 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 65, 91-92 (2003); Thelin, supranote 233, at 397, 399-401.
340. Farrell, supra note 339, at 1000-01; Haglund, supra note 339, at 442; Marburger &
Hogshead-Makar, supranote 339, at 84-85; Thelin, supra note 233, at 399-401.
341. Farrell, supra note 339, at 1001; Haglund, supra note 339, at 442; Thelin, supra note
233, at 399-401. Roster size is also criticized as a source of bloated expenditures. Division I
football teams now have more than one hundred players, eighty-five on scholarship. (In
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like these are not only wasteful, but they
blur the distinction between
342
professional and amateur collegiate sport.

Universities that are striving to comply with prong four would be
motivated to curtail unnecessary spending in the men's program to offset
some of the spending increases in the women's program. In fact, short of
command-and-control legislation by Congress or the NCAA, the incentive of
Title IX compliance could be the only force operating against the collectiveaction problem that has university athletic departments striving to outspend
one another on recruiting, coaches' salaries, and facilities. 43 Prong four
could help universities get spending under control and also restore college
football's amateur character.
3.

Compliance with a Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Is Based
on Predictable Factors Under the University's Control

Like the factors contributing to a university's prong-one proportionality
score, equitable funding is based on factors that are predictable and within a
university's control. OCR or a reviewing court would have to engage in some
subjective inquiry to ensure that a university is not attempting to pass off as
general, unallocated expenditures money that is actually being spent on
men's sports. However, as long as a university submits an honest and equal
budget, it can be assured that neither a court nor OCR will find that its
athletic program is discriminatory in violation of Title IX.
4.

Equitable Funding Compliance Could Mitigate Backlash
Against Title IX

Turning the dialogue to money instead of participation opportunities
could also help militate against Title IX backlash and create a healthier
dialogue about equity in sports. By focusing universities (and their
constituents) on the real problem of inflated athletic department budgets,
"trading" a male wrestler for a female volleyball player ceases to be the
operative rhetoric. Instead, if the wrestling team loses an assistant coach or a
training table due to budget cuts, it might notice that women's volleyball
received a commensurate gain, but it will also notice that men's football has
a staff of twenty-three. By changing the debate from one about athletes to
dollars spent on various athletes, the hope is that men's sports will start

contrast, NFL teams are half as large.) Farrell, supra note 339, at 1056-57 ("A team that is
playing a game with 11 players on the field does not need 140 players or even 100 players.
Professional teams in the National Football League have 47 players."). Big football rosters
increase the number of women's opportunities a university must provide to attain
proportionality compliance.
342. Farrell, supranote 339, at 998.
343. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 25 (acknowledging the need for national
action to control the escalating costs of intercollegiate athletics).
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comparing themselves to-and taking out their demands for equality onthe teams on their side of the ledger.
5.

Universities that Comply with a Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Are
Still Likely to Increase Participation Opportunities for Women

Even if proportionate expenditure, rather than proportionate
opportunity, is a university's compliance objective, the university is still likely
to continue to add participation opportunities for women. The larger the
disparities between its expenditures for men's and women's programs (and
the less it is willing to cut from the men's side of the ledger), the more it has
to invest in women's sports to achieve equitable funding. Some of this
reinvestment is just as likely to increase the quantity as well as the quality of
participation opportunities for female athletes.
To be sure, once a university achieves proportionate expenditures, it
would be free to add opportunities for men and cut opportunities for
women, so long as the aggregate funding for men's and women's sports stays
constant. But this possible reduction in athletic opportunities for women
under this approach is defensible because it comes with a commensurate
gain in the quality of opportunity. Proportionality compliance pressures
athletic departments to stretch women's programs' relatively smaller budgets
over as many female athletes as possible. Compared to an individual male
athlete, a female athlete may have less access to coaching, support, training
facilities, and meals. These inequities contribute to the perception that
universities favor men's sports and, therefore, do not cultivate women's
interest in sports to the same extent as men's. In an equitable funding
regime, universities use dollars instead of an athlete headcount to
demonstrate that they equally value women's athletics.
6.

A Proportionate-Expenditure Prong Would Eliminate "Artificial"
Caps and Floors

Another benefit to prong-four compliance is that it eliminates the
pressure on universities to artificially cap the number of players on men's
teams or expand the number of players on women's teams. Many schools
opt to attain prong-one proportionality compliance through some
combination of adding opportunities for women, while reducing the size of
men's teams. Cuts on the men's side usually squeeze out the players who
were not recruited. The Commission called this an "artificial" cap, noting
that because these players do not cost the university any scholarship dollars,
cutting their opportunities does not result in any commensurate benefit for
women. 344 On the women's side, universities often add whole new teams, but

344. See id. at 30. Cutting opportunities for walk-on players may be a politically problematic
consequence associated with proportionality compliance, but it is not a legal problem. Title IX
compels universities to end the discriminatory distribution of athletic opportunities, which can
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they also sometimes require coaches to add more women to a team than the
coach would prefer to carry.145 If a university opted to satisfy proportionate
expenditures instead of proportionate opportunity, the only4 6limit to the size
of its men's teams would be the size of its equalized budget.3
V.

CONCLUSION

The political debate about the Model Survey is, on the surface, a debate
about methodology--how institutions should be allowed to demonstrate
women's lack of interest in complying with Title IX. The 2005 Clarification
policy should be repealed. As a survey, it is methodologically flawed. As a
concept, it is destined to "provide[] only a measure of the very
discrimination that is and has been
the basis for women's lack of
"47
opportunity to participate in sports. 0
However, the 2005 Clarification also helps expose two latent
inconsistencies that have perpetuated confusion and political opposition to
Title IX: first, the inconsistency between interest-defined compliance and
structuralist equality; and second, the resulting inconsistency between the
fact that the three-prong policy operates to favor proportionality and OCR's
insistence that it is a flexible test. For Title IX's regulatory policy to be
effective, OCR must resolve these inconsistencies by retreating from its
rhetoric of flexibility regarding prong-three compliance and by offering
institutions the option to rely on something other than women's interests as
a benchmark for compliance.

be achieved by bolstering opportunities for women or just as well by eliminating athletics
altogether. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 272 ("Title IX's stated objective is not to ensure
that athletic opportunities available to women increase. Rather, its avowed purpose is to
prohibit educational institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex."); see also Chalenor v.
Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (8th Cir. 2002).
345. See, e.g.,
UNIV. OF IOWA, ATHLETICs REVIEW MERGER COMMITIEE FINAL REPORT 8
(Apr. 2005), available at http://www.uiowa.edu/president/task-forces/athletics-merger/
042505athletics-merger.pdf (recommending that the University of Iowa consider roster floors as
well as caps). Iowa found that coaches of its women's teams often prefer smaller teams because
they cannot afford to stretch their budgets over many additional players. A school that equalizes
funding between men's and women's programs would likely ameliorate this problem, giving
coaches of women's teams the flexibility to take walk-on players if they wanted to.
346. If walk-on players truly do not cost universities anything, then rosters have no limit.
But if, as one might suspect, there are costs associated with training, feeding, outfitting, gearing,
and providing travel for these players (notwithstanding proportionality opponents' claims that
they do not cost anything), these costs will influence a coach's decision on how many walk-on
players a team can afford.
347. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155,179 (lstCir. 1996).

